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Between 1952 and 1985, thirty out of thirty-three institutions,
whose teams won national championships in Division I basketball during
that era, were placed on probation for violating rules of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA" or "Association").' Matters
have not improved much on this score in the 1980s, a decade during
which 57 of 106 Division I-A schools have been censured, sanctioned, or
put on probation at least once. 2 It is little wonder, therefore, that Rich-
ard D. Schultz, Executive Director of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, opened the 1990 NCAA Convention with a State of the As-
sociation speech calling for major reform in intercollegiate athletics and
indicating that, "[iut's time to develop a new model [for the governance
of intercollegiate athletics]." 3 Schultz concluded his remarks by calling
on the delegates to the 1990 Convention to "be prepared by the 1991
Convention to introduce and pass legislation that will effect major
reform.'"4
With repeated calls from many sources for major reform of big-
time, revenue-producing intercollegiate athletics,5 the demand for sig-
nificant change in the operation of athletics programs at the collegiate
level may be reaching a crescendo. A consensus clearly is developing in
support of such reform. 6 Nevertheless, questions remain as to the con-
tent of an acceptable reform package. There are those who assert that
the NCAA is institutionally incapable of initiating and maintaining the
momentum in reform necessary to rectify that which is wrong with big-
time intercollegiate athletics. 7 On the other hand, at the de minimis end
of the reform continuum, there are those who believe that it may be
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I. COMMITrEE ON LABOR AND HUMAN RESOURCES, STUDENT ATHLETE RIGHT-TO-KNOW
ACT, S. REP. No. 209, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1989) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
2. Lederman, Nearly Half the Members in Top Division of NCAA Cited for Violations This
Decade, The Chron. of Higher Educ., Feb. 22, 1989, at A35, col. 3.
3. The NCAA News, Jan. 10, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
4. Id. at 6, col. 5.
5. This article will focus on the reform of big-time, revenue-producing intercollegi-
ate athletics (typically, football programs at NCAA Division 1-A institutions and basketball
programs at Division I institutions).
6. See Lilley, Convention Seen As Beginning of Era of Reform, The NCAA News, Jan. 17,
1990, at I, col. I [hereinafter Era of Reform].
7. See, e.g., R. TELANDER, THE HUNDRED YARD LIE: THE CORRUPTION OF COLLEGE
FOOTBALL AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO STOP IT (1989) [hereinafter TELANDER]. In that book
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possible to refine the NCAA regulatory system so that it can better re-
spond to the acknowledged excesses of big-time intercollegiate athletics.
Those who argue that the NCAA is structurally incapable of re-
sponding in a meaningful manner to the excesses of big-time intercolle-
giate athletics often assert that such athletics have become overly
commercialized and are a part of an entertainment, as opposed to an
educational, enterprise.8 For these advocates of major structural re-
form, the only viable reform strategies require the creation of an entirely
new system of governance for intercollegiate athletics.9
On the other hand, those who advocate reform from within the
NCAA emphasize that the Association is seriously misunderstood and
that there is significant support within existing structures to support sig-
nificant substantive reform.' 0 Advocates for this school of reform are
inclined to argue that there is a prevailing mood among regulators sup-
porting integrity in intercollegiate athletics."I These proponents of re-
form through refinement of existing structures add that, while there are
differing views within the NCAA, there is nevertheless a sentiment that
Telander, a writer for SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, begins by contending that the NCAA "is built
on hypocrisy and exploitation," Id. at 21, and later bares his feelings:
[LIet me tell you how I feel on a very primitive, visceral level about the NCAA: I
hate it. There is, I must confess, something about an organization that employs a
lot of people whose duty is to govern others with whom they have almost nothing
in common that just pisses me off. I see the NCAA's leaders as a bunch of know-
nothing, self-righteous stuffed suits who are willing to do just enough labor to
keep the organization running forever. That's my prejudice, and having stated it,
let me now set it aside and explain without bias why the NCAA can never bring
integrity to [big-time intercollegiate football].
Id. at 196. His "nonbiased" critique of the NCAA concludes, "[tihe real function of the
NCAA is to promote a good image of itself, make money, and protect the status quo. No
doubt NCAA brass would squawk that such is not the case, that they remain ever vigilant
for fraud and corruption in the college game, but protecting their own butts is what it's
really all about." Id. at 197-98.
Unfortunately, while Telander's book is an interesting and sometimes disquieting ac-
cumulation of a series of anecdotes that describe particularly egregious excesses in big-
time football, he is unable to escape his "bias" and his book ultimately serves as little more
than a journalistic diatribe. As will be discussed in this article, neither his reform package,
which largely calls for the professionalization of big-time intercollegiate football, nor his
contempt for the NCAA are justified. Indeed, while the NCAA "brass" is not without
blemish, calls for reform by people like Richard Schultz, the Executive Director of the
NCAA, are far more thoughtful and realistic than those proffered by Telander. Further-
more, Telander's assertion that NCAA officials know nothing about intercollegiate athlet-
ics and have little in common with athletes is simply inaccurate. The NCAA makes a
concerted effort to recruit former athletes, who understand intercollegiate athletics, to
work within the Association.
8. Id. at 127. William Friday, former President of the University of North Carolina
System, has argued in a similar vein that, "Americans have turned sports into a religion.
What we're getting pretty close to doing is turning our universities into entertainment
centers." The NCAA News, Aug. 16, 1989, at 4, col. 2 (citing The Washington Post).
9. Even Richard Schultz, the Executive Director of the NCAA [hereinafter "Director
Schultz"], seems to agree that structural reform is in order. See T. Lilley, New Athletics
Model Needed, Schultz Tells Delegates, The NCAA News, Jan. 10, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
10. Bryce Jordan, President of Penn State University has argued that, "Up to this
point, the NCAA has not been able to get the job done." As quoted in T. Sheeran, Public
Wants College Sports Reform, Jordan Says, The NCAA News, Dec. 27, 1989, at 4, col. 2.
I1. David Berst, Assistant Executive Director for Enforcement of the NCAA, recently
noted that he detects "an enhanced integrity mood, an institutional control mood or at-
mosphere .... I think that's what everyone's after." Id., col. 4.
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favors reform that will address the ills that currently plague intercollegi-
ate athletics. '
2
For my part, I contend in this article that reform must combine ele-
ments of arguments made by both schools. Structural changes are nec-
essary. Any substantive reform efforts must be supported by structures
that are designed to strengthen the voice of those who support reforms
of an academic nature. Additionally, structural reforms must be accom-
panied by substantive reforms. In both structural and substantive areas,
the focus must be on academic values. Indeed, one of the major
problems with reform efforts to date is that they have lacked a coherent
and unified focus, a focus that must be centered on academic values. To
date, the NCAA has purported to rely on various purposes and princi-
ples in its efforts to govern intercollegiate athletics. 13 While the educa-
tional value is one of those principles, perhaps even the principal value
adhered to by the NCAA in its efforts to regulate big-time intercollegiate
athletics,1 4 the NCAA has never adequately focused its reform efforts on
that value. The NCAA has never had a coherent and unified game plan
based on academic values; rather, it has simply moved from play to play,
reform to reform, without any sense of unified academic purpose. The
NCAA has also lacked focus in its reform efforts because it has contin-
ued to adhere to values, such as amateurism, that have little to do with
the realities of big-time intercollegiate athletics.
In this article, therefore, after explicating the values the NCAA pur-
ports to adhere to in regulating intercollegiate athletics, I begin by argu-
ing that the NCAA should jettison the amateurism principle, at least in
the governance of big-time, revenue-producing sports. By ceasing to
adhere to the amateurism value, the NCAA and others in a position to
influence the reform of intercollegiate athletics can assure that the re-
form focuses on academic values and can avoid the dissonance and disil-
lusionment related to the sense that the NCAA is inherently suspect
because it indulges in hypocrisy when it asserts amateurism on the one
hand and signs a $1 billion television contract for televising big-time
basketball on the other hand. 15 In addition tojettisoning the amateur-
ism value, the NCAA must create or refine governance structures that
12. Thus, Director Schultz reacted to the "successes" of the 1990 Convention by con-
cluding that "there is now within the membership a very strong and urgent feeling that we
need some reform . . . that we need change. And I think what took place (during the
Convention) is a very positive step in that direction." Era of Reform, supra note 6.
13. See infra notes 16, 18, 19, and 46.
14. See infra notes 16, 18 and 19 and accompanying text.
15. Lederman, New Affluence Brings College Sports a Problem: How Widely to Spread $1-Bil-
lion TV Bonanza, The Chron. of Higher Educ., Dec. 6, 1989, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter cited
as Lederman, TV Bonanza]. Big-time basketball, which was the source of that bonanza,
does not stand alone, however, as a significant commercial enterprise. In 1988, over
$500,000,000 in revenue was generated by 104 Division I-A institutions from gate, televi-
sion and licensing receipts of big-time football. TELANDER, supra note 7, at 44. This com-
mercialization of big-time football renders calls for amateurism on the part of student-
athletes suspect. Questions as to why the athletes who generate those revenues should
remain un- or under-compensated will not be muted until amateurism notions are jet-
tisoned for big-time, revenue-producing sports.
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will aid in the development of a unified package of reforms. The NCAA
needs an academic game plan, not a sporadic effort at piecemeal reform.
The NCAA should design a long-range plan. for reform based on aca-
demic values.
In Part II, I deal with the values that ought to underlie intercollegi-
ate athletics and that ought to be central to major reform efforts. Part
III, in turn, examines the types of structural changes that should be im-
plemented to enhance the capacity of those governing big-time intercol-
legiate athletics to focus on appropriate academic values. In Part IV, I
briefly examine two major substantive issues, whether academic values
could be furthered by holding a national championship in big-time foot-
ball and whether [and if so, how] we should pay athletes involved in
major revenue-producing sports, in light of those same underlying aca-
demic values. Part V is my conclusion.
II. AN EXAMINATION OF THE VALUES THAT OUGHT TO SERVE AS THE
FOUNDATION FOR BIG-TIME INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
(AND THOSE THAT SHOULD NOT)
In Article 1 of the NCAA Constitution, the fundamental policy or
basic purpose of the Association is set forth:
The competitive athletics programs of member institutions are
designed to be a vital part of the educational system. A basic
purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate athlet-
ics as an integral part of the educational program and the ath-
lete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing,
retain a clear line of demarcation between intercollegiate ath-
letics and professional sports.
16
Actually, this policy states two basic values or purposes: (1) the educa-
tional value, maintaining intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of
the educational program, and (2) the amateurism value, retaining a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports. These two values or purposes may be complementary in some
instances, but, as will be argued in this article, they are separable. For
example, arn athletic event can be amateur in nature without being an
integral part of an educational program, and as I argue in the following
section, an athletic program may be commercialized without necessarily
compromising its role as an integral part of an educational enterprise.
Thirteen principles for the conduct of intercollegiate athletics by
members of the NCAA are delineated in Article 2 of the NCAA Consti-
tution. Those principles can largely be grouped under either the educa-
tional value, the amateurism value, or the value of equal competition.
This third value of equal competition often is referred to as the need for
a "level playing field,"' 17 and is designed to ensure that no school is
16. NCAA CONST. art. I, § 1.3.1, reprinted in NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N.
1989-90 NCAA MANUAL 1 (1989) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
17. Wilford Bailey has noted that many problems with the NCAA's legislative process
are attributable to "the widespread desire to achieve a perfectly flat playing field." Cited in
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given benefits that are not also made available under the NCAA rules to
other similarly situated institutions. In the following sections of Part II
of this article, I discuss these values and evaluate each of them to ascer-
tain whether or not they should be foci for the reform of intercollegiate
athletics.
A. The Educational Value
As previously noted, the educational value is set forth in Section
1.3.1 of Article 1 of the NCAA Constitution. Arguably, it receives fur-
ther support and definition in Sections 2.2 and 2.4 of Article 2 of the
Constitution. Respectively, those provisions provide as follows:
2.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF STUDENT-ATHLETE WELFARE.
Intercollegiate athletics programs shall be conducted in a man-
ner designed to protect and enhance the physical and educa-
tional welfare of student-athletes.
1 8
2.4 THE PRINCIPLE OF SOUND ACADEMIC STANDARDS. Intercol-
legiate athletics programs shall be maintained as a vital compo-
nent of the educational program and student-athletes shall be
an integral part of the student body. The admission, academic
standing and academic progress of student-athletes shall be
consistent with the policies and standards adopted by the insti-
tution for the student body in general. 19
Together with Section 1.3.1 of Article 1, these sections make it clear that
the NCAA professes to adhere closely to academic or educational values
in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, including big-time, reve-
nue-producing sports at the collegiate level. Most commentators favor
tying the regulation and reform of big-time intercollegiate athletics to
educational values or principles, 20 although some recent advocates of
major reform in intercollegiate athletics believe that big-time, commer-
cialized athletics at the collegiate level cannot be tied to academic or
educational values. The skeptics, however, claim that in order to avoid
hypocrisy, institutions ought to recognize that their commercialized ath-
letics programs cannot be effectively tied to pristine educational
values.
2 '
NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETE'S ASSOCIATION, NCAA PRESIDENTS COMMISSION THIRD
NATIONAL FORUM at 60 (1988) [hereinafter THIRD FORUM]). This value largely is set forth
in Art. 2, § 2.7 of the NCAA Constitution, supra note 16, at 4, which provides that:
The structure and programs of the Association and the activities of its members
shall promote opportunity for equity in competition to assure that individual stu-
dent-athletes and institutions will not be prevented unfairly from achieving the
benefits inherent in participation in intercollegiate athletics.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id.
20. Chancellor Oliva of New York University has written that:
Athletics have an eminently defensible educational role in higher education. If
you don't believe that, you're in trouble. If you can't justify the relationship be-
tween your institution and its athletic program on an educational basis, then you
might just as well make athletics a business enterprise.
Oliva, Do the Right ThingAbout Athletics, REPORTS, THE JOURNAL OF THE Assoc. OF Gov. BDS.
OF UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES,July and August 1989, at 11-12 [hereinafter Oliva].
21. See, e.g., TELANDER, supra note 7, at 217-18.
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Professor John Weistart recently opined that every suggested re-
form ought to be evaluated under the standard of whether "the particu-
lar reforms insure that they will help restore education as institutions'
primary foCUS?" ' 2 2 In doing so, he took the view that the educational
values ought to be central to questions of reform. In that same com-
mentary, however, Professor Weistart evidenced some ambivalence with
regard to this position when he inquired as to whether or not it was
"sensible, or even- realistic, to link all pre-professional training in basket-
ball and football to a four-year degree."'2 3 Actually, there is a certain
consistency to Professor Weistart's view, if one interprets education
broadly, to include other forms of technical training that might not nec-
essarily lead to a four-year degree. Another alternative would be simply
to add a separate minor league of some sort in football and basketball
that was not connected to education. 24 By creating such a minor league,
that emphasized prowess in athletics and that had little or no relation to
formal education or the intercollegiate world, institutions with intercol-
legiate athletics programs could focus more easily on academic or edu-
cational values. This result would occur because the athletes who are
not interested in receiving a formal education would be removed from
their institutions, leaving only students who happen to want to partici-
pate in intercollegiate athletics while obtaining an education.
At any rate, even proponents of reforms that would divorce much of
big-time athletics from the academic world argue that they do so in or-
der to strengthen educational values. Thus, significant unanimity re-
mains among the disputants regarding the issue of maintaining
academic or educational values and standards in intercollegiate athlet-
ics. Nevertheless, little attention has been brought to bear on the issue
of what educational or academic values inhere directly or indirectly in
intercollegiate athletics. This unwillingness to focus on those issues in a
thoughtful way is exacerbated by the reaction of academics who assert
that big-time athletics is not a "critical ingredient" of the academic life
of the university. 25 Thus, whether as a matter of academic hostility to
athletics, 26 which may itself be based on some lingering class bias,2 7 or
22. Weistart, Serious Reform of Colege Sports Must Go Beyond Fine Tuning, The Chron. of
Higher Educ., Jan. 10, 1990, at A52, col. 3.
23. Id. at col. 1.
24. Id. Professor Weistart opts for such a view, as does Rick Telander in his critique
of college football. TELANDER, supra note 16 at 214. For my part, once intercollegiate
athletics is reformed to focus on educational values, I would leave the formation of such a
minor league to market forces. If there is a demand for such a league on the part of
athletes who are uninterested in receiving a formal education and there is a public demand
for the entertainment provided by those athletes, then such a league will no doubt be
formed.
25. A President of a major Big 10 football power recently ruminated that, "I don't
think athletics is even a critical ingredient at this university." The Columbus Dispatch,
Dec. 3, 1989, at IA, col. 3. Such a statement is a blend of naivete and possibly even aca-
demic hostility to athletics-a certain hope that by ignoring or isolating intercollegiate
athletics it might go away or responsibility for its operation might be placed on other
shoulders.
26. Richard Lipsky recognizes the existence of "academic hostility toward sports" and
asserts that:
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simply a lack of analytical focus due to inattention to detail, the interplay
between big-time athletics and education has been woefully under-scru-
tinized. For example, in two recent cases, the Kansas Supreme Court
held. that the NCAA was exempt from state taxes on the ground that the
NCAA was involved in education. 28 In exempting the NCAA on educa-
tional grounds, however, the court avoided any examination as to what
constitutes an educational or academic purpose. Indeed, the court sim-
ply exempted the NCAA on the ground that it was an association that
represented educational institutions in the operation of their intercolle-
giate athletics programs. The court never examined the NCAA's in-
volvement in regulating intercollegiate athletics or intercollegiate
athletics itself to ascertain whether or not such athletics are educational
in nature, even though in National Collegiate Realty Corp. v. Johnson County
the court framed the issue as "whether the NCAA's use of the premises
is exclusively for educational purposes." 2 9 Later, in the text of that opin-
ion, the court refrained the issue as "whether any activities in the use of
the property were not exclusively for educational or other exempt pur-
poses. '"30 This framing of the issue should have led the court to inquire
as to whether or not intercollegiate athletics and the NCAA's involve-
ment therein were "exclusively" educational in nature. However, the
court refrained from doing so by simply concluding with a holding that
is little more than an ipse dixit: "There is no serious contention that,
generally speaking, physical education and sports programs in universities
are not within proper 'educational purposes'."''  The court's very use of
the language "generally speaking" seems to indicate that the justices
were troubled by the fact that aspects of sports programs as well as the
NCAA's role in governing those programs may not directly relate to ed-
ucational purposes. As such, it is hard to understand how, without more
analysis, the court could conclude that the NCAA used its property ex-
clusively for educational purposes.
This superficial equivocation regarding the interplay between ath-
letics and academics hinders efforts to reform intercollegiate athletics by
On many college campuses the football or basketball team carries more prestige
than any academic subject or academician. Historically, coaches and physical ed-
ucators have struggled with professors and deans over the alleged overemphasis
of intercollegiate sports. Additionally, coaches often are anti-intellectual, which
strikes a responsive chord in the American public. Not to be outdone, intellectu-
als have exhibited an equally potent snobbery and disdain. As a result, the study
of sports has been left to physical educators, who have not examined its larger
political and social implications.
R. LIPsKY, How WE PLAY THE GAME 6 (1981) [hereinafter Lipsky].
27. The arts are the playground of the rich, and one seldom hears complaints that arts
are not educational and should not be part of the educational enterprise. Athletics are like
arts in significant respects - ballet in all its beauty is akin to the play of a Michael Jordan.
Athletics, however, are in some measure the playground of the poor and are often pro-
claimed to be uneducational or not a fit part of the educational enterprise. See infra note
32 and accompanying text, for a discussion related to athletics as an artistic endeavor.
28. NCAA v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 781 P.2d 726 (Kan. 1989); National Collegiate
Realty Corp. v. Johnson County, 690 P.2d 1366 (Kan. 1984).
29. 690 P.2d 1366, 1371 (1984).
30. Id.
31. Id. (emphasis added).
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conforming the athletics programs to clearly articulated educational val-
ues. As such, a very important part of any effort to assess reform pro-
posals from an academic vantage point, or in terms of educational
values, preliminarily must deal with the issue of whether big-time inter-
collegiate athletics are educational or can be operated to further educa-
tional values.
Donna Lopiano, associate athletic director at the University of
Texas, has argued that:
Athletics, like music, art and drama is a performing art. The
athletic contest is no different than the theatre or the sym-"
phony, albeit the audience appears to be more rabid... Athlet-
ics and theatre must be, at their heart, laboratory settings
where the exceptionally talented student maximizes his or her
potential.
32
In her remarks, Lopiano added that, "[i]t is-only when we define athlet-
ics as an educational program very closely comparable to an academic
entity that we finally possess the litmus paper with which we can test the
legislative and other answers to problems in athletics, which have
evaded resolution for close to 80 years." ' 33 Thus, at least in one sense, it
can be argued that participation in athletics is comparable to participa-
tion in the orchestra or drama and can provide a litmus test for assessing
reform efforts. In this regard, it would also seem that big-time athletics
should be supported as part of the academic enterprise, because such
athletic opportunities give the athlete the opportunity to refine and de-
velop his or her skill in the crucible of the best competition available.
However, despite the appeal of such an argument for those who would
argue that athletics are educational, it is not clear why such activities
must be performed before large, paying audiences or why activities such
as drama, dance and orchestra are themselves educational, thereby ren-
dering athletics derivatively educational so long as athletics can be re-
lated to other performing arts.
In addition to arguments that participation in intercollegiate athlet-
ics is educational in nature, by analogizing such participation to the per-
forming arts, it has been asserted that athletics is like research, and as
such should be considered an apt part of the academic enterprise at the
intercollegiate level. After arguing that service to society is an impor-
tant aspect of the educational enterprise, Kenneth J. Weller of Central
College (Iowa) recently made an interesting argument to the effect that:
A pervasive and logical case can and should be made for athlet-
ics programs based on societal objectives. Like research, ath-
letics can become somewhat autonomous in its organization
and can be financed from outside sources, and like research it
can and should be respected as an integral part of the mission
32. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, SIXTH SPECIAL CONVENTION PRO-
CEEDINGS 72 (1987), cited in Smith, Reforming Intercollegiate Athletics: A Critique of the Presidents
Commission's Role in the NCAA"s Sixth Special Convention, 64 N. DAK. L. REV. 423, 450 (1988)
[hereinafter Smith, Sixth Special Convention].
33. Id.
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of an educational institution. 34
Thus, in addition to the assertion that participation in athletics is as
much a part of the educational enterprise as are drama, dance and other
performing arts, it can be argued that big-time athletics, like research,
play an important role in serving societal interests. In both instances,
however, I remain troubled that we still may be begging the question by
merely arguing that by analogy to other practices that are accepted to be
a part of the educational enterprise, athletics should be declared to be
an apt part of the collegiate academic enterprise. Those other practices
- performing arts and research - must themselves be tied to some
educational theory, and then athletics could be assessed in light of that
theory, not only by analogy to the practices that purportedly comply
with the underlying theory. Furthermore, stating that athletics, like re-
search, perform a service function, without further explication of the na-
ture of that service is to indulge in incomplete analysis. One must
examine the nature of the service arising out of big-time intercollegiate
athletics in order to support athletics as academics on such grounds.
President Gordon Gee of the University of Colorado recently ar-
gued for a third sense in which athletics can be considered to be an
integral part of the educational enterprise. He noted that, "[c]ollegiate
athletic competition had its origins in the Greek ideal of education.
Apart from intellectual and aesthetic development, physical education
and competition were essential to molding character. ' '3 5 Others have
made similar arguments. Chancellor L. Jay Oliva of New York Univer-
sity has opined that athletics can be justified on educational grounds
because athletic participation develops character by teaching the athlete
to learn to work with other people and to put his or her ego on the line
in support of a perceived worthy objective. 36 Coach Bo Schembechler
of Michigan is perhaps a bit more crass when he asserts that participa-
tion in athletics teaches the participant the importance of winning.
37
Big-time intercollegiate athletics may support the educational en-
terprise in other direct ways. Allen Guttman has noted that, "[i]n sport
we can discover the euphoric sense of wholeness, autonomy, and po-
tency which is often denied us in the dreary rounds of routinized work
that are the fate of most men and women."
'3 8
In a similar vein, Richard Lipsky writes that sport is a microcosm of
34. THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 36.
35. See Gee, A College Superbowl: The Ultimate Sellout, N.Y. Times,Jan. 1, 1990, at 19, col.
2. One wonders, however, whether sports does as much to build characters (see, e.g., Brian
Bosworth,Jim McMahon, etc.) as it does to build character. Nevertheless, even the build-
ing of characters may in some sense promote creativity in expression and may be tenu-
ously tied to educational values.
36. Oliva, supra note 20, at 12.
37. See Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32, at 444, where Schembechler is
quoted as saying that, "it is important to win. That is the American Way." Indeed, while I
use the term "crass" to depict Schembechler's view, it nevertheless may be true that instil-
ling a winning spirit, or the desire for achievement directed to victory, may be a character-
building endeavor and may have a place in our educational system.
38. A. GUTrMAN, FROM RITUAL TO RECORD: THE NATURE OF MODERN SPORTS 157
(1978) [hereinafter Guttman].
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life that is "rich [with] symbolism and dramatic structure," 39 and that as
such it "contrasts sharply with a world of widespread alienation, a world
in which people long for close individual and communal ties to over-
come the impersonality and coldness of American life."'40 Lipsky adds
that, "[t]he Sportsworld becomes a cultic movement that compensates
for the deficiencies of the world surrounding it."'4 1 As such, intercolle-
giate athletics may perform a dual function of creating a healthy diver-
sion for students4 2 and a sense of community that ties students ever
closer to the educational enterprise and to one another.43 This is
equally true presumably with alumni and others who are in some way
tied to a given institution.
As each of the preceding arguments for the tie between athletics
and the educational enterprise indicate, it can be argued with some force
that athletics is and should be an integral part of collegiate education.
Of course, one need not examine each of the preceding arguments
closely to discern that the relationship is delicate and must be viewed
circumspectly or at least analytically - asking whether a particular as-
pect of intercollegiate athletics in fact furthers or is closely related or
fitted to the types of educational interests asserted. Relatedly, questions
must be raised on the micro, individual student-athlete, level as well as
on the macro level which deals with the relationship between athletics
generally and the institution. In this regard, one commentator has
stated that, "[riecognizing that a university owes some form of recipro-
cal commitment to its student-athletes necessitates an inquiry into the
nature and extent of this commitment. This commitment is typically
termed the University's 'duty' to educate its student-athletes. '4 4 Thus,
not only must the relationship between big-time athletics and academia
be clear, but the institution must also fulfill its educational obligation to
39. LIPsKY, supra note 26, at 10.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. I use the term "healthy" intentionally, because it is my sense that at times we may
become so immersed in athletics that it becomes more like a religion and an end in itself
rather than a diversion. In her thoughtful article, Professor Rush agrees, noting that col-
lege athletics has become "almost religious in nature .... " Rush, Touchdowns, Toddlers and
Taboos, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 549, 560 (1989) [hereinafter Rush]. By focusing on the academic
value of sport as a diversion, however, attention can be drawn to the excesses of such a
view and care can be taken to avoid transforming athletics from a diversion to a drug that
becomes an end in itself that overwhelms the remainder of reality.
43. Ernest Boyer has been quoted as making this point:
Big-time sport, collegiate and professional, is becoming the new civil authority in
our culture. It draws the pride and unifies the community the same way great
cathedrals did in earlier times. Today, successful coaches have an importance
that would rival that of priests and bishops of the church.
Boyer in R. LAPCHICK AND J. SLAUGHTER, THE RULES OF THE GAME: ETHICS IN COLLEGE
SPORT Xi (1989) [hereinafter LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER]. Again, of course, concern must
be directed to assuring that the sense of community created by big-time sport does not
become a substitute for other forms of social and political community.
44. Dixon, Achieving Educational Opportunity Through Freshmen Ineligibility and Coaching Se-
lection: Key Elements in the NCAA Battle for Academic Integrity of Intercollegiate Athletics, 14 J.C. &
U.L. 383, 385 (1987). See also Jennings and Zioiko, Student-Athletes, Athlete Agents and Five
Year Eligibility: An Environment of Contractual Interference, Trade Restraint and High-Stake Pay-
ments, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 179, 216 (1989).
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the student-athlete. Indeed, this second requirement, to the effect that
the educational institution must act in a manner that meets the educa-
tional interests of the student-athlete, may be more significant in evalu-
ating individual reforms taken in conjunction with the governance and
operation of the athletics program than is the requirement that athletics
have some direct tie to macro educational values.
Care must be taken to protect both the micro interests of the stu-
dent-athlete and the macro interests of the educational institution itself
in analyzing any reform package demonstrated by the interplay between
Section 2.2 of Article II of the NCAA Constitution, calling for the pro-
tection of the physical and educational welfare of student-athletes, and
Section 2.4, requiring that intercollegiate athletic programs be main-
tained "as a vital component of the educational program." For the sake
of its own institutional integrity, an institution must evaluate the role
that athletics plays at the institution generally. Additionally, for the sake
of its ethical and educational duty to its individual students, the institu-
tion and other entities involved in governing intercollegiate athletics
must be attentive to the educational needs of the student-athletes. In-
deed, care must be taken to ensure that structural and substantive re-
forms address the need to protect the student-athlete's interests,
particularly given the student-athlete's relative lack of power in the deci-
sionmaking process related to the governance of intercollegiate athle-
tics. 4 5 Much of this article, therefore, will focus on the impact of various
reform proposals, both as a structural and as a substantive matter, on
the student-athlete, thus confirming the need to emphasize the educa-
tional value as it relates to the individual student-athlete.
As such, I assert that every reform package, my own included, must
be evaluated to ascertain whether or not it directly furthers educational
purposes both at the institutional and the student-athlete levels. If those
questions are not raised and analyzed, then decisions will necessarily be
suspect. Indeed, as I assert throughout this article, one of the major
problems with the governance of intercollegiate athletics is that clear-
cut thoughtful articulation of the underlying values supporting big-time
intercollegiate athletics, and the evaluation of the relationship between
those values and particular actions, is too often non-existent or post hoc,
occurring at the time that decisions are made rather than at the time that
reforms are formulated. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in Parts
III and IV of this article, such an analysis is immensely helpful in evalu-
ating the current status of intercollegiate athletics and the reforms of-
fered to deal with existing maladies.
Having concluded that there is both a direct or macro and indirect
or micro relationship between intercollegiate athletics and educational
45. See Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association's Death Penalty: How Educators
Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L.J. 985, 1050-57 (1987) [hereinafter Smith, Death
Penalty ], for a discussion of the need for more attention to the interests of student-athletes
and for a delineation of a series of reform proposals to provide greater recognition for the
student-athletes' interests in the governance of big-time intercollegiate athletics.
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values adhered to by colleges and universities, in the remainder of this
section, I will explore whether other asserted governance values or prin-
ciples are also helpful.
B. The Amateurism Value
As previously noted, both Sections 1.3.1 and 2.6 of Articles I and II,
respectively, of the NCAA Constitution require that attention be given
to the principle of amateurism, in evaluating NCAA regulations. In par-
ticular, Section 2.6 provides that, "[s]tudent-athletes shall be amateurs
in an intercollegiate sport .... Student participation in intercollegiate
athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from
exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises."
4 6
There is less consensus among commentators regarding the utility
of the amateurism value, particularly as it relates to the heavily commer-
cialized, revenue-producing sports of Division I-A football and Division
I basketball that largely make up big-time intercollegiate athletics. For
example, in his recent book assailing big-time intercollegiate football,
Rick Telander argued that the concept of amateurism is "corrupt."
4 7
Relatedly, it has been argued that it is questionable to assert that stu-
dent-athletes should be protected "from exploitation by ... commercial
enterprises" when the NCAA has just signed a $1 billion television con-
tract for big-time basketball. 4 8 Nevertheless, it remains conceivable that
amateurism may nevertheless be defended, as it relates to the role of the
student-athlete, despite the fact that Division I institutions are on a com-
mercial fast-track. As was the case with academic or educational values,
the interests of the student-athlete might be separated from those of the
institution. As such, amateurism might need to retain some vitality to
protect the student-athlete from exploitation, but not necessarily to
eliminate all commercialization of intercollegiate athletics.
It does not take great insight to recognize that assertion of the ama-
teurism value has a certain self-serving allure for the institution, in that
it might justify institutional refusals to share the income generated from
such athletic events with the athlete who helped to earn it.4 9 However,
even before assailing the amateurism value on the ground that it is self-
serving, it would be worthwhile to examine the value itself as it relates to
big-time athletics in the intercollegiate context. To begin with, like "ed-
ucation," amateurism is difficult to define. Professor Ronald Smith has
pointed out that we have never come up with "a successful, workable
definition of amateurism." '50 In fact, if amateurism means that an ath-
lete does not receive anything of economic value for his or her participa-
tion in intercollegiate athletics, 5 1 it is recognized more in the breach
46. NCAA CONST. art. II, § 2.6, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 4.
47. TELANDER, supra note 7, at 48.
48. In such circumstances, Telander refers to nonpayment of athletes as "a form of
modern day slavery." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 50, (citing R. SMITH, SPORTS AND FREEDOM (1988)).
51. An "amateur" has been defined as, "one who engages in an art, science, or sport
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than in reality in both Divisions I and II, because athletes receive schol-
arships for their participation in many intercollegiate sports at those
levels.
Athletic scholarships, which can be worth more than $10,000 per
year, can hardly-be said to be a non-economic benefit to their recipient.
Pure amateurism would seemingly require that a student not receive
anything of economic value for his or her participation in intercollegiate
athletics. That is why Professor Susan Rush has noted that today we
have "scholarship amateurism" as opposed to "pure amateurism" in
big-time intercollegiate athletics. Nevertheless, Professor Rush goes on,
correctly I believe, to note that the movement from "scholarship ama-
teurism" to "pure professionalism" would be a bold and, perhaps, un-
warranted step.
5 2
Actually, the matter of economic value received by the student-ath-
lete for his or her participation in intercollegiate athletics goes well be-
yond the issue of the receipt of a scholarship. Student-athletes involved
in big-time intercollegiate athletics receive many other benefits of eco-
nomic value as well, including: access to academic support; room and
board, which are often grouped with tuition in descriptions of scholar-
ship aid; and other tangible benefits including access to training person-
nel and equipment and related perquisites. Thus, it is clear that
student-athletes do receive substantial economic benefits. 53 Neverthe-
less, can it be said that some vestige of amateurism ought to remain, as a
litmus test in evaluating regulatory and related reform of big-time inter-
collegiate athletics?
For a number of reasons, I do not believe that amateurism should
continue to be a significant litmus test, except where it can be asserted
to protect a student-athlete from actual exploitation. First, amateurism
in big-time intercollegiate athletics is anachronistic and may even be re-
flective of some class bias. 54 It is at best anachronistic and clearly is
hypocritical because institutions are generating substantial revenues
from their major athletic programs and because intercollegiate athletics
have been prone to some degree of professionalism from their very in-
ception. 55 Athletes have been paid; sometimes quite well. 5 6 However,
at least with the rise of the NCAA and its professed allegiance to ama-
teurism, payments beyond those enumerated in the preceding para-
for enjoyment rather than money," WEBSTER'S II, NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY, OFFICE
EDITION at 24 (1984).
52. Rush, supra note 42, at 581.
53. See infra notes 306-15 and accompanying text, for a discussion of how student-
athletes are "paid" for participating in college sports.
54. See, e.g., Rush, supra note 42, at 552, where Professor Rush argues that amateurism
reflects a "split between social classes," with only the middle and upper-middle classes
being able to afford to be amateurs. As such, it may be anachronistic, in that it is a throw-
back to an era when only the leisure classes had the time and wherewithal and were per-
mitted to participate in athletics. See also TELANDER, supra note 7, at 49. For his part,
Telander argues that even ancient amateurism is little more than a myth.
55. See Smith, Death Penalty supra note 45, at 987-91.
56. Id. at 989.
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graph have been forced underground or under the table. Nevertheless,
as institutions reap revenues from their big-time sports events, and in
light of the fact that athletes in those sports often come from lower
socio-economic classes, 57 the very appearance of impropriety ought to
be of concern to academic institutions. Relatedly, as Professor Rush has
pointed out, amateurism reflects a "split between social classes," in that
the middle and upper-classes can afford to be amateurs, while the lower-
classes socio-economically can ill-afford such a luxury.58 Also, it is
troublesome that amateurism may be used as a prop to maintain the
current state of affairs, under which funds are generated by revenue-
producing sports, which have a large percentage of minority participants
in their ranks, both racially and economically, and are used by the insti-
tution to fund other operations, athletic and non-athletic alike. For ex-
ample, dollars are often taken from the funds generated by a big-time
football or basketball program to fund "minor" sports, such as swim-
ming, tennis, and other sports that tend to have participants who often
are from other social classes. In a sense, institutions take from the poor
and give to the rich.59 The same is true to some degree when a revenue-
producing sport generates funds that are used elsewhere in the univer-
sity. Certainly, the minority athlete gets to share in the benefits that
come from such revenue-sharing, but that benefit is indirect and is di-
luted by the fact that more students from nonminority classes are able to
benefit from such gifts than are minorities at the typical university,
where nonminorities outnumber minorities significantly. Dollars gener-
ated by revenue-producing sports should be directed to academic pur-
poses that support the student-athletes who participate in those sports.
To do otherwise may be to engage in subtle, unintended racism and
classism. Of course, one might argue that the funds should go, in part,
to women's athletics, to rectify inequities in funding for women's athlet-
ics and Title IX may require as much. However, I would maintain that it
would not be inequitable to have all scholarships for participants in non-
revenue-producing sports be need-based.
In addition to being hypocritical, anachronistic and perhaps even
biased, the invocation of amateurism as a value critical to the operation
of big-time intercollegiate athletics, may inhibit the necessary focus on
the educational value. Indeed, amateurism seems to be of utility only to
the extent that it furthers educational or academic values. The value of
amateurism as a principle related to the governance of big-time intercol-
legiate athletics seems to be related to its capacity to focus on exploita-
tion that may result from too much attention to economic and
commercial matters and too little attention to educational ones. As
such, nothing would be lost by focusing solely on the educational value
and jettisoning the amateurism value, as applied to big-time intercollegi-
57. See, e.g., R. Lapchick, Race on the College Campus, in LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra
note 43, at 63-68.
58. Rush, supra note 42, at 552.
59. This is precisely what minorities and lower economic classes believe to be happen-
ing. See LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 79-82.
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ate athletics. In fact, much might be gained. In particular, enforcing
amateurism values may detract from the educational benefits made avail-
able to the student-athlete. I make a version of this argument when I
assert that athletes should be paid, but that pay should be focused on
educational benefits, directly related to the needs of student-athletes
who participate in time-consuming, revenue-generating athletics.
Finally, in a related sense, by focusing on the academic needs of
student-athletes involved in prominent sports, rather than amateurism,
savings might be generated in other areas, including the savings gained
by eliminating non-need-based scholarships for minor sports. 60 Indeed,
amateurism may have some utility at that level, because if the assertion
that there is subtle class bias in the amateurism value applied across the
board, to revenue-producing and non-revenue-producing sports, is ac-
curate, then it might be applied to non-revenue-producing sports in an
even purer form without raising objections of class bias. In other words,
sports like swimming and tennis, which are largely non-revenue-produc-
ing and whose participants often come from middle and upper-income
groups, could be made purely amateur, with scholarships granted only
on the basis of need, and the savings generated could be directed to
assistance in the form of academic support for the student-athletes in-
volved in revenue-producing sports.
All of the preceding arguments indicate that it would be appropri-
ate to jettison the amateurism value, as it applies to big-time revenue-
producing sports, while retaining it as to other sports; perhaps, so long
as the focus remains on academic or educational values, both at the in-
stitutional and the individual student-athlete levels. As such, when one
considers the reform of big-time intercollegiate athletics, amateurism is
of little help and may, in fact, constitute a detriment.
C. The Principle of Competitive Equity
The principle of competitive equity provides that, "[t]he structure
and programs of the Association and the activities of its members shall
promote opportunity for equity in competition to assure that individual
student-athletes and institutions will not be prevented unfairly from
achieving the benefits inherent in participation in intercollegiate athlet-
ics."' 6 1 Additionally, this principle is further defined in Article II Section
2.13 of the NCAA Constitution which provides that, "[ijntercollegiate
athletics programs shall be administered in keeping with prudent man-
agement and fiscal practices to assure the financial stability necessary for
providing student-athletes with adequate opportunities for athletics
competition as an integral part of a quality educational experience."
62
60. It has been noted that the "major types of [athletic] expenses classified by object
are grants-in-aid." M. RAIBORN, REVENUES AND EXPENSES OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS
PROBLEMS: ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL T RENDS AND RELATIONSHIPS 1981-85 42 (1986). Since
grants-in-aid are a major expense, eliminating all aid other than need-based aid in minor
sports would generate substantial savings.
61. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 4.
62. Id. at 5.
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Like amateurism, the principle of competitive equity can and should be
subsumed in the academic value.
In its efforts to maintain competitive equity and contain costs, the
NCAA arguably may violate antitrust law. It was on such grounds that
the NCAA was held to violate antitrust law in its exercise of control over
the televising of intercollegiate football. 63 In its efforts to maintain a
level playing field, so the argument would seem to go, the NCAA inhib-
its competition on the part of those who are more effective and efficient
in developing and packaging their big-time athletics programs.
In questioning such reasoning, Professor Grauer recently con-
tended that:
Because sports league members operate in the broad en-
tertainment market, they are forced to produce an entertain-
ment product that can compete successfully for consumers'
limited leisure time funds. The most effective and competitive
product that sports league members can produce is a series of
competitions among relatively evenly balanced teams, leading
to a championship. Thus, the product that the league members
produce in concert is not simply a unique product that each
league member could not produce on its own; it is also a neces-
sary product for the league members to be able to compete ef-
fectively and efficiently for the limited leisure time dollars of
consumers in the broad entertainment market. Because the
production of this product enables the league members to com-
pete effectively and efficiently, the cooperation needed to pro-
duce this product must be deemed efficiency enhancing.
Therefore, this cooperation cannot be anticompetitive in the
consumer welfare sense and should be deemed the internal co-
operation of a single entity. 64
However, while Professor Grauer makes a substantial argument for why
the NCAA does not necessarily engage in an antitrust violation when it
organizes a championship or otherwise tries to further its level playing
field and cost-containment values, he understandably does not deal with
the issue of whether or not such values should constitute litmus tests in
evaluating and promulgating rules and regulations to govern big-time
intercollegiate athletics. Nevertheless, Professor Grauer's treatment of
the issue highlights the fact that such values are important insofar as
they enhance efficiency and cost savings among members and also
seems to intimate that those values are inherently secondary in nature.
Both efficiency and cost-containment are secondary values, in that one
must always ask why efficiency and/or cost-containment are important.
It is important to save money, but the real importance of such saving
relates to what the money saved will be used to produce or acquire. In
63. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (in which the
College Football Association successfully challenged the NCAA's control over television
broadcasting of big-time collegiate football on antitrust grounds).
64. Grauer, The Use and Misuse of the Terms "Consumer Welfare'" Once More to the Mat on
the Issue of Single Entity Status for Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 64 TUL. L.
REv. 71, 99 (1989).
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Section 2.13, of its Constitution, the NCAA seemingly recognizes this
when it asserts that such fiscal and related cost-containment practices
are necessary to provide "student-athletes with adequate opportunities
for athletics competition as an integral part of a quality educational ex-
perience." Efficiency and cost-containment are important to further the
educational value, both in terms of athletic participation as an educa-
tional value in itself and in terms of the indirect benefits accruing to the
student-athlete from the efficient operation of intercollegiate athletics.
As such, the primary focus should remain on academic or educational
values; efficiency and cost-containment should not be permitted to be-
come ultimate ends in themselves. If they were to become ends in them-
selves, they might be used to temper or dilute the educational value,
particularly as it relates to student-athletes involved in big-time intercol-
legiate athletics. For example, it is conceivable that it might be argued
that funds could be saved by cutting academic services to the student-
athletes involved in big-time intercollegiate athletics. It would not be
enough that cost savings or efficiency ensued; it would also be necessary
to inquire whether such savings unduly inhibit educational values.
D. Summary
In this Part of my article, I have argued that the educational value,
both institutionally and as applied to the particular student-athletes in-
volved in big-time intercollegiate athletics, should be retained and
should become the focal point of all efforts to reform the regulation of
intercollegiate athletics. Other values espoused by the NCAA, including
amateurism, efficiency and cost-containment, are at best secondary, in
that they should be used to enhance the educational value, as related to
big-time intercollegiate athletics. When those values become ends in
themselves, however, they may actually be invoked in a manner detri-
mental to academic values.
In the remaining sections of this article, I will seek to apply my con-
clusion that academic matters can and should be used as the primary
litmus test in evaluating reform efforts related to the regulation of big-
time intercollegiate athletics. In Part III, I examine structural reforms
that would further educational or academic values. In turn, Part IV con-
tains an analysis focused on academic values of two major substantive
proposals that are being discussed at this time in light of academic val-
ues. The analysis in each of those parts of this article demonstrate that
vitality can be given to the educational value, in a manner that leads to
some surprising conclusions.
III. REFORMING BIG-TiME INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS THROUGH
FOCUSING ON EDUCATIONAL VALUES: SOME STRUCTURAL
REFORMS
Professor Weistart recently indicated that most proponents of re-
form in big-time intercollegiate athletics advocate a refinement of the
current system, a refinement that focuses on creating new rules to deal
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with old problems. 65 He added that it will not be enough to refine the
current system, unless such refinement is accompanied by "structural"
reforms, such as reforms in the institutional makeup of the NCAA gov-
ernance system. 6 6 I agree that structural changes must accompany sub-
stantive reforms in order to address the problems that appear to inhere
in big-time intercollegiate athletics. Indeed, one of the major problems
with the nature of most proffered reforms is that they are piecemeal in
nature - they address a single problem or related set of problems with-
out recognizing that to tinker with a single problem may simply result in
similar difficulties arising in other areas. For example, increasing the
penalties for violating NCAA rules may increase the risk to one who
would "cheat" to win, and may decrease the relative number of coaches
willing to take that risk, but it may also increase the benefits to those
who are able to "cheat" surreptitiously or who believe that they can or
must do so to win. Similarly, making freshmen ineligible for athletics
competition may help further the academic value,6 7 but standing alone,
it cannot insure that more student-athletes will make significant aca-
demic progress and ultimately graduate with an education. Issues of
punishment, eligibility and academic progress, among others, are inter-
dependent or polycentric in a reform sense. Structural and substantive
changes, therefore, must come in packages; packages that are designed
as coherent efforts to further the educational or academic values that
must be at the core of the operation of intercollegiate athletics
programs.
In this section, therefore, I will examine structural suggestions that
will further academic values. However, those structural changes can
only be of significance when they are coupled with substantive changes
that, together with the structural changes, focus on educational values.
A. Structural Reforms Within the NCAA
The NCAA is often maligned and misunderstood. In his book re-
garding intercollegiate football, Rick Telander expresses his contempt
for the NCAA and asserts, with only anecdotal support, that those in-
volved in the NCAA "know nothing."'6 8 Whether Telander is expressing
his real view or merely is indulging in journalistic license or exaggera-
tion to make his point that big-time intercollegiate football is in serious
need of reform, his position belies a certain misunderstanding regarding
the operation of the NCAA. The NCAA simply is an association of
schools involved in intercollegiate athletics at various levels. The
schools send delegates to conventions, where those delegates vote on
issues related to the governance of intercollegiate athletics among the
65. Weistart, supra note 22.
66. Id.
67. 1 say "may" because there is evidence that indicates studenit-athletes perform bet-
ter in an academic sense during the playing season, when they actually are participating in
athletic competition, See Slatton, Freshman neligibility: Whose Interests Are Served, The NCAA
News, Nov. 6, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
68, IELANDER, supra note 7, at 196.
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membership. As such, the NCAA is not an evil behemoth, but is merely
reflective of the views of its membership as evidenced in the NCAA's
legislative process.
For his part, Professor Brody has argued that the NCAA is inher-
ently suspect because it facilitates the operation of what he refers to as
the "association syndrome" which he defines as, "the ability of a group
[like the NCAA] to hold values that no single member of the group has
or, at least, would admit to having. . . . Under the 'association syn-
drome' the sum is not greater than the parts; it is different from any of the
parts." 6 9 If Professor Brody is correct, then the NCAA might well be an
entity deserving of vilification, because it would provide its members
with a structure that is somehow inherently bad or is peculiarly suscepti-
ble to being used by those who would impose their tainted view on other
unwitting participants in the NCAA governance process. However, as I
have argued elsewhere at some length, 70 the NCAA membership might
use the "association syndrome" to aid in the collective promotion of
values, such as academic integrity, in the operation of their athletic pro-
grams that could not be promoted on their individual campuses for
political reasons. On many campuses, powerful groups, including
alumni, boosters, trustees, legislators and others committed to a "win-
at-all-costs" athletics philosophy, pressure the President and others to
bend to their will. Indeed, that is just what happened at Southern Meth-
odist University (SMU) throughout the 1970's and much of the 1980's,
when athletics personnel engaged in wanton violation of the NCAA
rules to satisfy the almost insatiable desire of certain institutionally pow-
erful groups for victories on the playing field. 7 1 Collectively, in the
open forum provided by the NCAA, those committed to furthering aca-
demic values could do so, with less threat of retribution than might be
felt on their individual campuses, if they only would exert the will to do
so. As such, the NCAA might provide just the kind of forum or climate
"in which college presidents can work for change without fearing for
their jobs."'7 2 If this is the case, as I believe it is, the presidents need
only exercise their "will", assuming they have one. 73 At any rate, it
seems clear to me that at most the so-called "association syndrome" is
neutral, in that those interested in meaningful reform may use it if they
have the will to do so or they simply may defer to those who would use
the system for more pernicious, less academic, purposes.
For my part, I would assert that the NCAA is unfairly maligned on
the facts, as well. Admittedly, the NCAA's record of reform is hardly
69. Brody, NCAA Rules and Their Enforcement: Not Spare the Rod and Spoil the Child -
Rather Switch the Values and Spare the Sport, 1982 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 109, 110 n. 5.
70. Smith, Death Penalty, supia note 45, at 996-98.
71. THE COMMITTEE OF BISHOPS, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SOUTHERN
METHODIST UNIVERSITY (June 19, 1987) [hereinafter SMU REPORTI.
72. Lederman, !lesburgh and Friday to tHead Knight Panel on Reforning Sports, The Chron.
of Higher Educ., Oct. 4, 1989, at Al, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Lederman. Panel].
73. As President Friday puts it, "[wle must develop the political will among the aca-
demic leadership to address these problems and do something about them . i..." Id.
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unblemished, particularly insofar as inaction is concerned. 74 Neverthe-
less, the NCAA has engaged in some meaningful efforts, preparatory
and otherwise, that could lead to significant structural and substantive
reform. For example, while Senator Bradley has asserted that the NCAA
has done "too little, too late" with regard to disclosing graduation rates,
it should be noted that the NCAA actually initiated efforts to accumulate
and ultimately disclose graduation rates. 75 Thus, it was the NCAA, and
not Senator Bradley, that spawned the idea of accumulating and disclos-
ing graduation rates. The NCAA has initiated studies and has taken ac-
tion in other areas as well. 76 In particular, the NCAA has initiated or
completed formal studies at both the institutional (e.g., institutional self,
studies7 7 ) and the national (e.g., the study regarding student-athletes in
the academic environment 78 ) levels. With those studies, as will be dis-
cussed throughout the remainder of this article, the NCAA has the be-
ginning of a data base from which to evaluate and promulgate reforms.
Indeed, I believe that the latter-half of the 1980's might well be referred
to as the era of preparation of reform. 79 With the data currently avail-
able (and that soon to become available) 80 regarding the academic as-
pects of intercollegiate athletics, the NCAA is poised to exercise its will,
if it has one, in reforming intercollegiate athletics. A death knell for the
NCAA might be in order if it fails to engage in meaningful reform dur-
ing the next few years, but it would be premature to commence a dirge
at this time. Indeed, as will be discussed, there are some indications that
the NCAA is mustering both the data and the concerted will necessary to
initiate a game plan of reform.
If the members of the NCAA can muster the needed will, significant
reform will be possible, both structurally and substantively. The follow-
ing structural reforms should be considered in exercising that will.
1. Accrediting Intercollegiate Athletics
As early as 1982, an independent Select Committee on Athletic
Problems and Concerns in Higher Education, established by the NCAA,
recommended "a comprehensive audit and certification program in in-
tercollegiate athletics in order to bring 'sunshine' to athletics pro-
74. In the words of Senator Bradley, the NCAA often does "too little, too late." The
Chron. of Higher Educ., Sept. 20, 1989, at Al. col. 2.
75. NCAA, REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITrEE ON ATHLETIC PROBLEMS AND CONCERNS
IN HIGHER EDUCATION, at 11 (1983) [hereinafter 1982 REPORT].
76. See, e.g., Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1050-57 for a discussion of some of
the major reform initiated in 1985.
77. Id. at 1006-08.
78. See The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 12, col. 1. for an indepth discussion of the
NCAA Forum regarding the major, independent research project commissioned by the
NCAA regarding student-athletes.
79. The 1990 Convention has been called by some the beginning of the era of reform.
The NCAA News,Jan. 17, 1990, at 1, col. 1. If this is so, as only time will tell, the second
half of the 1980's might well be deemed the era of preparation for reform.
80. For example. the NCAA study regarding restructuring of the governance system is
to be delivered to the Council sometime during 1990. The NCAA News, Oct. 30, 1989, at
1, col. 1.
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grams. ' '81 Since that time there have been some preliminary steps taken
toward the creation of an accreditation or certification program.
In June of 1985, the NCAA passed a resolution that provides that
institutions are to "conduct a comprehensive self-study and evaluation
of their intercollegiate athletics programs at least once every five
years." 82 The self-study must include information regarding institu-
tional purpose and athletics philosophy, the authority of the chief execu-
tive officer in personnel and financial affairs, athletics organizations, and
administration, finances, personnel, sports programs, recruiting poli-
cies, services for student-athletes and student-athlete profiles. 83 This
self-study was introduced as the precursor to accreditation or certifica-
tion of athletic programs.
84
The hue and cry for accreditation of intercollegiate athletics has not
dissipated. President Coor recently argued in a national forum that in-
tercollegiate athletics should be incorporated into the accreditation pro-
cess at the institutional level. 85 He has been joined in that call for an
accreditation process by other influential individuals concerned about
the reform of intercollegiate athletics.
86
In April of 1989, Director Schultz introduced a proposal for the de-
velopment of a certification/peer review process for the evaluation of
the operation of intercollegiate athletics programs at member institu-
tions.8 7 Later in 1989, Schultz established a blue ribbon panel to review
college athletics and to examine the status of the certification/peer re-
view process. 88 The NCAA Council has supported Schultz's call for a
certification or peer review process, and would make it voluntary for
1990.89 In the 1990 Convention of the NCAA, Schultz summarized the
nature of the voluntary certification procedure, which he referred to as a
"pilot program." 90
With this move toward voluntary certification, and given that the
self-study and academic reporting requirements are in place, the accred-
itation of intercollegiate athletics programs should not be difficult. As
Chancellor Oliva recently recognized, since schools already pay for the
81. 1982 REPORT, supra note 75, at 19.
82. Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1006-08.
83. Id. See also NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, § 6.3 at 40-4 1.
84. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1006 n. 125. Within this framework,
support for accreditation has grown. For example, Father Hesburgh recently stated that
he favors "a stringent accrediting system for college sports, in which all facets of a sports
program - academic, financial and otherwise - would be monitored closely and regularly
by an outside auditor." Lederman, Panel, supra note 72, at 42, col. 2.
85. THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 55.
86. See, e.g., J. OLIVA, WHAT TRUSTEES SHOULD KNOW ABOUT INTERCOLLEGIATE ATH-
LETICS, AGB SPECIAL REPORT, at 27-29 (1989) [hereinafter AGB REPORT].
87. Certification, Proposal 42 Among Items on Council's August Agenda, The NCAA News,
July 19, 1989, at I, col. 3. Schultz first introduced his certification/peer review proposal in
April of 1989.
88. Initial-eligibility Legislation has Proved Beneficial, The NCAA News, Sept. 18, 1989, at
3, col. 4.
89. Prepared Text of Schultzs Convention Address, The NCAA News, Oct. 23, 1989, at 3,
col. 3.
90. The NCAA News, Jan. 10, 1990, at 6, col. 2.
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accreditation process, bringing accreditation teams to colleges and uni-
versities to take a piercing look at athletics on campus should not create
significant additional economic burdens. 9' Any additional costs related
to the implementation of an accreditation process at the Division I level,
which may be the only level at which accreditation of athletics programs
should be required, could be funded at the national level out of the $1
billion in television revenues to be received under the upcoming con-
tract recently negotiated by the NCAA and out of football revenues, if
the NCAA can wrest some control over those funds away from the his-
torically avaricious College Football Association ("CFA").
Ernest Boyer has argued for a stringent accreditation program:
When serious athletic violations are discovered, the accredita-
tion status of the institution should be revoked - along with
the eligibility status for the National Collegiate Athletic Associ-
ation. It is ironic that one hears that a university has lost its
athletic eligibility but never hears that a college has been on
accreditation probation or suspended because of unethical be-
havior in athletic procedures or its abuse of students.
9 2
Stringent accreditation requirements would induce those involved in the
administration of higher education to be more attentive to the operation
of their athletics programs and, as such, would enhance the likelihood
that focus will be placed on academic matters in the operation of big-
time athletics programs-at the institutional level.
While the NCAA might be involved in appointing an accreditation
team member who is familiar with the operation of a big-time athletics
program and with the rules governing such a program, other members
of the accreditation team should not defer entirely to the findings made
by that member of the committee. Other members of the accreditation
team also should be actively involved in assessing the role of athletics at
the school being accredited. Such an accreditation process would have
numerous benefits: it would provide a school with an external evaluation
of its athletics program and would help to buffer an institution from in-
ternal pressures that might be contrary to the institution's academic
objectives; it would provide accreditation team members with much
needed exposure to the role of intercollegiate athletics at other institu-
tions and would sensitize them to the kinds of concerns that they ought
to have regarding their home institution's program; and, perhaps most
importantly, it would serve as evidence that athletics are a significant
part of an institution's academic program and would force presidents
and other academic administrators to be directly concerned about the
operation of their institution's athletics program. The accreditation
process would firmly place the athletics program within the academic
mission of an institution and would help to increase focus on educa-
tional issues or values as they relate to the operation of intercollegiate
athletics.
91. Oliva, supra note 20, at 13.
92. LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at xii-xiii.
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In developing such an accreditation process, it will be necessary to
establish accreditation standards, both nationally and institutionally.
While those standards can be related to the rules governing intercollegi-
ate athletics, they must do more than just replicate the rules - they also
must focus on direct and indirect educational values served by big-time
intercollegiate athletics and must look closely at the internal operations
of big-time athletics programs. 93 There must be some examination, in
an accreditation visit, of the educational values purportedly furthered by
the operation of an institution's athletics program. In that analysis there
should be some examination of whether or not the athletics program
fulfills an educational value at the macro level by virtue of its: (1) being
treated like a performing art;94 (2) fulfilling a service function analogous
to research; 95 (3) building character in the participants; 9 6 (4) developing
a sense of community among participants and spectators; 9 7 and/or
(5) providing a meaningful diversion from the alienation involved in
routine work. 98 Relatedly, and perhaps more importantly given the po-
tential for a conflict of interest on the part of the institution, the accredi-
tation process also must examine closely the issue of whether student-
athletes are being treated as students and are being given the necessary
support to assure that their opportunity to gain an education is maxi-
mized. 99 Indeed, it is at this micro student-athlete level that accredita-
tion standards can best be fashioned in a concrete manner. For
example, graduation and academic progress standards,' 0 0 as well as re-
quirements regarding tutorial and academic support programs,0l
should be promulgated and enforced. By examining both the macro,
large value questions, and micro, student-athlete related educational
values furthered by the athletics program, the accreditation process can
do much to ensure that big-time athletics remain consistent with the aca-
demic mission of the institution being accredited.
Accreditation should also include a close examination or audit of
the athletics budget, to ensure that academic values are being furthered
in budgetary allocations and to ensure that the budgetary process is
under the control of academic interests within the institution. As such,
accreditation can assure that the budget process is not controlled by in-
terests outside the institution's governance structure. The accrediting
body also should examine recruiting and related procedures to see that
they are conducted ethically and in a manner conducive to academic
integrity.
93. As Father Hesburgh has argued, academic, financial and other aspects of the ath-
letics program should be closely evaluated. Lederman, Panel, supra note 72, at AI, col. 1.
94. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
97. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 18-27 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 301-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the need to pay
student-athletes with academic support.
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Among structural reforms, the addition of an accreditation process
is a must. While it will not cure problems, it will draw attention to aca-
demic values and could help provide the necessary information, pres-
sure and will for more meaningful substantive reforms at the
institutional, conference and national levels.
2. The Academic Impact Statement
In a recent national forum, Wilford Bailey argued that the NCAA
should require a statement of intent and rationale for each piece of sig-
nificant legislation considered by the NCAA. 10 2 Proposal 68,103 passed
at theJanuary, 1990 NCAA Convention provides for just such a publica-
tion of statements of intent and rationale for all legislation. The next
step that should be taken would be to require that all statements of in-
tent and publicized rationales be grounded in academic values. With
such information in hand, delegates can assess the academic value of
particular legislative proposals.
The Advisory Committee to Strengthen the Presidents Commission
recently recommended that an "academic impact statement" be pro-
vided for each proposed piece of legislation. ' 0 4 Such a proposal would
take the statement of intent yet a step further toward achieving academic
integrity in the operation of big-time intercollegiate athletics. If every
piece of legislation had to be supported by an academic impact state-
ment, delegates and the public alike would be able to focus on the values
underlying that legislation and would be able to evaluate the legislation
on that basis. Such a structural addition to the NCAA process would be
beneficial both substantively and symbolically, as an indication that the
NCAA genuinely is concerned about academics.
By analogy to other existing legal constructs, an academic impact
statement could be built on a form like that provided for in environmen-
tal impact statements which are commonly used to explicate the impact
of a particular land use or related proposal on environmental values. 10 5
102. See THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 62, where President Bailey is quoted as saying:
I suggest that the preliminary proposals be accompanied by not only a statement
of intent, but also by a concise statement of rationale for the proposed amend-
ment. The latter should provide a briefjustification for the proposed legislation
as an effective way to address the problem in the context of the principles for the
conduct of intercollegiate athletics to which the membership is committed.
Such a procedure could do much to help focus attention on academic justifications or
purposes related to each proffered piece of legislation.
103. Proposal 68, which was adopted at the 1990 Convention, has been summarized as
follows:
To revise the Association's amendment process to establish new deadlines for
amendments-to-amendments, to require the identification of a primary contact
person for each legislative proposal submitted by the membership, to redefine
permissible amendments-to-amendments, to establish a new publication date for
certain amendments-to-amendments, and to require the submission and publication of
statements of intent and statements of rationale for all legislative proposals.
Reprinted in The NCAA News, Dec. !1, 1989, at 3, col. 3. (Emphasis added).
104. Commission Receives Advisory Committee Statement, The NCAA News, Aug. 2, 1989, at
3, col. 2.
105. See, e.g., Baker, Kaming and Morrison, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENTS; A
GUIDE TO PREPARATION AND REVIEW, Practicing Law Institute (1977). In Chapter 5 of that
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As such, the academic impact statement could be built around a series of
questions that address both the macro educational values purportedly
furthered by intercollegiate athletics' 0 6 and the micro effect on the stu-
dent-athletes' educational opportunities and progress.'1 7 A well-de-
vised academic statement could do much to further a renewed emphasis
on academic values, and might even include a requirement that the an-
ticipated cost of the legislation be balanced against educational values
furthered or at least justified on such grounds. It, therefore, is clear that
use of an academic impact statement, particularly when included with a
meaningful accreditation process, could do much, as a structural matter,
to reinforce academic values in the operation of intercollegiate athletics
programs.
3. Organizational Changes Within the NCAA
In addition to adding a meaningful accreditation process and a re-
quirement that an academic impact statement be filed with every new
piece of legislation considered by the NCAA, the NCAA could undergo
some structural reform that would support the furtherance of academic
values in the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
a. Federation to Recognize Diferences Among Athletics Programs
There has been significant clamor for increased federation in the
NCAA governance structure. "08 Such federation, which would facilitate
variation in the rules applied to programs at various institutions based
on the differences in emphasis in those programs, seems to be sup-
ported by the great disparity economically and in terms of emphasis
among institutions in the operation of their intercollegiate athletics pro-
grams. Economically, programs at the Division III level are often run
with budgets in the thousands of dollars, while Division I programs are
operated under budgets in the hundreds of thousands and millions of
dollars.' 0 9 Indeed, even in Division I, the disparity is so great, ranging
from programs operated with a budget of as little as $400,000 to pro-
grams operated in the $15-20,000,000 range.I 0 The economic disparity
among programs, even at the Division I level, is indicative of major dif-
ferences in terms of emphasis in the operation of athletics programs.
Some athletics programs have budgets that make them big businesses,
and the NCAA needs to recognize this by focusing on the furtherance of
educational values in the context of such big-time athletics programs.
Such focus can be enhanced by federation proposals that would permit
text, the authors examine the contents of environmental impact statements and the rela-
tionship between such statements and land use values.
106. See supra notes 32-43 and accompanying text, for an explication of the macro
values.
107. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text, for an explication of the micro
values.
108. See THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 23.
109. See id. at 24, for a discussion by Director Schultz of the disparity in athletics budg-
ets and the need for giving more attention to federation issues.
110. Id.
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the NCAA to treat different programs in terms of economics and empha-
sis differently.
With rising revenues generated by such big-time programs, ii and
the need to decide how to best utilize NCAA revenues, which have
grown enormously during the past few years,' 12 there has been more
talk of the need to share revenues among programs to ensure equality of
competition, a level playing field.' 3 Based on this increased push for
revenue-sharing and a recognition that programs within Division I are
quite different in terms of emphasis both economically and in terms of
sports offered, with many Division I programs which do not offer foot-
ball, Thomas Hansen, Commissioner of the PAC-10 Conference, has ar-
gued that schools with broad-based programs should be treated
differently than institutions with limited programs.' "4 Indeed, as early
as 1982, an independent Commission established by the NCAA sug-
gested that, "institutions with major, revenue-producing programs be
provided greater autonomy in the NCAA's legislative process."''1 5 It is
not surprising, therefore, that current legislative efforts reflect a trend
toward increased federation. ' 16
Federation efforts can enhance the focus on academic values in big-
time intercollegiate athletics, but will not do so without some vigilance
on the part of members and without other structural changes, such as
the addition of an accreditation process and academic impact state-
ments. Legislative autonomy, with regard to the promulgation of rules
and regulations governing large programs, that recognizes the differ-
ences between those programs and smaller programs, without compro-
mising academic values, should be welcomed on the ground that such
legislation is more realistic and less hypocritical. For example, it is clear
that big-time programs do not further the amateurism value and should
not be subjected to its strictures.' 17 Smaller programs, or minor sports
within larger programs, on the other hand, may be more amateur in
nature.
Furthermore, such federation may be designed in a fashion that di-
rectly furthers academic values. For example, it could be coupled with
revenue-sharing among like programs, with such revenue-sharing focus-
ing on academic values and needs that are largely indigenous to big-time
I 1l. See SENATE REPORT, supra note I, at 4, stating that annual revenues for college
sports are estimated to be $50 billion.
112. See, e.g., Lederman, TV Bonanza, supra note 15, at A 1, where it is noted that reve-
nues from the NCAA's television contract alone will average $143 million yearly.
113. Id. See also, 1982 REPORT, supra note 75, at 20-21 (an early call for institutions to
bond together to maximize revenues and benefits generated by big-time intercollegiate
athletics).
114. See Lederman, TV Bonanza, supra note 15, at A29.
115. 1982 REPORT, supra note 75, at 14.
116. See, e.g, Convention Legislation Reflects Trend Toward More Federation, The NCAA News,
Nov. 13, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
117. See supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the need to jetti-
son the amateurism value as related to intercollegiate athletics.
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athletics.' 18 Similarly, rules might be fashioned to reflect particular
macro values furthered by such major athletics programs, and the micro
interests of the student-athletes who participate in those programs. In
this regard, for example, student-athletes participating in big-time inter-
collegiate athletics typically spend more time away from their studies
and away from class than do other athletes and students involved in
other extra-curricular programs. Student-athletes in such sports pro-
grams, therefore, have different academic needs.' 19 As argued later in
this article, legislation should be devised to meet those different aca-
demic needs, 120 and any efforts to further federation should be com-
bined with such legislation.
There also is a sense in which federation-like issues arise at the in-
stitutional level. Institutions involved in big-time, revenue-producing
athletics programs, generally football and basketball, typically also offer
minor sports that do not generate significant revenue and are run at a
loss. Thus, a school might offer football and basketball, which generate
revenues, while also offering sports such as track, tennis and swimming,
that may entail costs that exceed revenues. Legislation should be fash-
ioned that recognizes these differences, as well, for a couple of reasons
First, the pressures that accompany revenue-producing sports may
be quite different for all parties involved, including administrators,
coaches and student-athletes, than the demands related to minor sports
at the same institution. Thus, there may be some need to examine po-
tential demands placed on coaches and athletes involved in major pres-
sure-packed sports that may not exist in the operation of minor
sports. 121
Second, as I implied earlier in this article, 122 I have a sense that
there is some lingering bias or racism involved in failing to recognize the
differences between major, revenue-producing and minor, cost-generat-
ing programs at institutions. On the one hand, particularly in the case
of football and basketball, many of the athletes involved in major sports
are minorities and come from lower socio-economic backgrounds than
the typical participants in sports like tennis and swimming. 123 Particu-
larly when combined with the time-consuming nature of participation in
big-time athletics, these differences in terms of race and socio-economic
118. Revenue-sharing could be conditioned on the attainment or performance of cer-
tain academic objectives or conditions by the recipient institutions.
119. See NCAA Forum, The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 12-13. (A principal research
scientist at the American Institues for Research, Robert J. Rossi, compares the demands
on student-athletes involved in big-time athletics with their student counterparts, who are
heavily involved in extra-curricular activities.).
120. See infra notes 301-18 and accompanying text.
121. The disparity in coaches' salaries between major and minor sports may be reflec-
tive of this variance in pressure and risk. It seems clear that a coach in a minor sport might
suffer through a series of losing seasons without jeopardizing his or her contract, while the
position of a coach in a major sport would be in jeopardy if he or she failed to win. But see,
N. Y. Times,Jan. 7, 8 and 9, 1990 (a series of articles regarding pressures in minor sports).
122. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
123. See LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 63-80, for a discussion of racial and
related issues in intercollegiate athletics.
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background may beget differences related to the needs of the student-
athletes, in the areas of financial aid and academic support, and should
be reflected in the rules governing such athletics programs.12 4 Taking
dollars that are needed to meet the peculiar academic needs of athletes
involved in big-time athletics to support athletes involved in minor
sports, therefore, may be Robin Hoodism in reverse - taking from the
poor and giving to the rich.
In any event, federation efforts at the national institutional levels,
which appear justified on their face, must be accompanied by a search-
ing examination of their ramifications for academic values, both in a
macro and a micro sense. In moving toward federalism, therefore,
changes should be conditioned on the furtherance of academic values.
In discussing federation, Chuck Neinas, Executive Director of the
CFA, recently suggested four possible options that might be imple-
mented at the Division I level: (1) retaining the status quo; (2) more
stringent membership requirements for Division I; (3) creation of a Divi-
sion IV category; or (4) creation of an auxiliary organization for major
programs. 12 5 Of these options, I believe that the most viable one is the
second. Given the disparity in emphasis and economics between ex-
isting Division I programs, option number one simply is no longer real-
istic. In turn, creating a new Division IV at the bottom of the NCAA
hierarchy would impact most significantly on Divisions II and III and
would do little to address the enormous disparities of emphasis involved
in Division I programs. Option four is unacceptable because it takes
programs outside the gambit of NCAA control and would only be ac-
ceptable if the move were accompanied by very stringent adherence to a
set of rules that focus on academic values. One benefit to such a move
would be that the entire fabric of rules could be newly assessed from an
academic perspective. However, given the likelihood that such a move
would be motivated by economic as opposed to academic purposes,'
26 I
could not support a move away from NCAA governance unless it were
heavily conditioned on academic values. In this. regard, even option
two, which recognizes the need for more federation, must itself be con-
ditioned primarily on academic as opposed to economic needs. Of
course, it is hopeful that the economic and related pressures that seem
to be dictating a move toward federation may give institutions and the
124. See infra notes -306-15 and accompanying text, for a discussion of the need for
additional educational compensation for such student athletes.
125. THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 32.
126. For example, from its formation, the CFA has done little to further academic val-
ues and was designed to feather the economic nests of its members by serving as a conduit
through which television revenues generated by the broadcasting of football games be-
tween member institutions could pass. The experience of the CFA indicates that the crea-
tion of a super-division, without expressly tying the creation to academic values, merely
would serve as a new and larger conduit through which revenues could pass to fuel major
athletics programs. However, such greed may well spell the demise of the CFA, as wit-
nessed by the fact that Notre Dame University recently "took the money and ran" in mak-
ing a contract directly for the televising of its football games. The $40 million contract by
Notre Dame may signal the unraveling of the CFA. See Lupica, With TV Deal, Notre Dame
Sells Higher Ideals Down the Tube, The National Sports Daily, Feb. 11, 1990, at 10, col. 1.
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NCAA another opportunity to examine how academic values can be fur-
thered as a part of such a move.
b. Redistribution of Power. Increasing the Role of Certain
Institutional and Other Actors Within the NCAA
Governance Structure
In order to effectuate the necessary focus on academic values in re-
forming intercollegiate athletics, there will be some need for restructur-
ing within the governance structure of the NCAA and its member
institutions. In restructuring, the emphasis should be placed on empow-
ering those groups that, by their very nature, are most inclined to favor
academic reform. There also is a need for additional support resources
for those groups that would be most inclined to further the academic
values that should inhere in the operation and governance of intercolle-
giate athletics. However, more than empowerment is required. There
must also be the will and the willingness to commit that most precious of
all resources - time - to institute major reforms on the part of those
who espouse the importance of academic integrity in big-time intercolle-
giate athletics programs.
Those directly involved in administering intercollegiate athletics
programs, the athletic directors and coaches, have historically had the
greatest interest in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, and that
interest has often translated into power within the regulatory realm.
12 7
The athletic directors and coaches typically have not been leaders in the
reform effort. Unfortunately, oftentimes the proponents of meaningful
reform have been ill-prepared 12 8 as compared to athletic directors and
coaches, and have lacked support from others who should share their
interest in supporting major reform efforts in intercollegiate athlet-
ics. 129 Without better preparation on the part of those who must lead
the effort for reform and more support from others who should favor
academic integrity in the operation of big-time intercollegiate athletics,
the likelihood of meaningful reform is marginal. Nevertheless, struc-
tures can be developed that will help increase preparation on the part of
constituencies prone to support academic values and may provide those
who espouse major reform with the information base necessary to sway
those who waver in their support of such reform.
Recently, there have been calls within the NCAA for the hiring of a
consulting firm to examine the NCAA governance process. 130 Such a
consulting firm should also be directed to examine the structure, as well
as the legislative process, of the NCAA. In doing so, the firm should
evaluate the entire governance process in light of the academic values
127. See discussion in Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32, at 430-39.
128. Id.
129. For example, when the President of the University of Iowa came out in support of
freshmen ineligibility, which in his view would support academic values, the Governor of
Iowa sought favor with the public by denouncing the University President. See The Chron.
of Higher Educ., April 19, 1989, at Al.
130. THIRD FORUM. supra note 17, at 58.
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that must be furthered within the NCAA. In other words, for example,
in assessing the power of the NCAA Council' 3 l in governance issues,
the firm should determine whether the selection process for and makeup
of the Council is reflective of those groups that, by their nature, are
most inclined to support academic values. 132 In doing so, the consult-
ing firm might well conclude, as President Coor has, that there is a need
for a policy committee, made up of individual members of the Presi-
dents Commission, who should naturally, by virtue of their position, be
concerned with academic integrity in intercollegiate athletics, and mem-
bers of the Council. The committee would be given significant poli-
cymaking authority. 1
33
In the following sections, I will examine the kinds of structural ad-
justments that could be made to enhance the likelihood that academic
integrity would be central to the operation of intercollegiate athletics
programs.
(1) The Executive Director
Historically, the Executive Director of the NCAA has been a signifi-
cant force in the governance of intercollegiate athletics, less because he
has been given express powers and more because he has been able to
forge his position into one of some authority, by the power of persua-
sion and by his control over staff and related matters at the NCAA head-
quarters. In this regard, just as the "reign" of Walter Byers, as
Executive Director of the NCAA, ushered in a "new era" in intercollegi-
ate athletics,' 3 4 the current tenure of Richard Schultz may well portend
yet another new era in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. With
increasing regularity, Schultz has called for major reform of the NCAA
to ensure "academic integrity and rules compliance" in intercollegiate
athletics.i35 Indeed, Director Schultz's early call for a "major re-
form" 1 3 6 effort in intercollegiate athletics at the 1991 Convention is au-
dacious, in a heartening way. Schultz has placed the force of his position
behind the movement for major reform, and time will tell whether or
not he will have squandered the necessarily limited capital of his posi-
tion in support of a platform and call for reform that will not be heeded.
However, while it will be informative to observe the 1991 Convention to
see whether or not the delegates respond to his clarion call for reform,
131. The Council consists of 46 members, representing each of the three NCAA divi-
sions, and is arguably the most powerful group currently in the NCAA governance struc-
ture, See NCAA CONST., art. IV, § 4.1, repinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 17-20.
132. Drawing representation, as the Council does, from Divisions I1 and III might fur-
ther academic reform because programs at those levels tend to be tied closer to the aca-
demic enterprise, but representatives from those divisions might lack understanding
regarding the need for and the nature of reform necessary at the Division I level.
133. See THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 56-57. But see Witte's remarks to the effect that
there is little support among influential members for such a committee within the NCAA
governance structure. Id. at 67.
134. For a discussion regarding the "reign" of Walter Byers, see Smith, Death Penalty,
supra note 45, at 993-94.
135. See, e.g., The NCAA News, Jan. 10, 1990, at 6, col. I.
136. Id.
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Schultz deserves to be supported by the presidents and others in his
efforts in this area.
There is little that can be done directly as a structured matter to
support Schultz in his efforts, short of giving him authority to introduce
a major reform package of his own, much like the President is permitted
and expected to offer a legislative agenda in our national government.
If Schultz is able to put together a coherent reform package and garner
support for it from academic circles, it might be worthwhile to give the
Executive Director the power to initiate legislation. Indeed, such an ef-
fort might help insure coherence in legislation. Short of giving the Di-
rector such power, it might be possible to increase formal ties between
the Executive Director and groups like the Presidents Commission that
should be supportive of his efforts to reform intercollegiate athletics to
ensure academic integrity and rules compliance.
(2) The Council
The Council is arguably the most powerful entity in the NCAA gov-
ernance structure as currently constituted. The Council has power to:
(1) "[e]stablish and direct the general policy of the Association in the
interim between Conventions,"' 13 7 (2) "[a]ppoint such committees as
may be necessary for executing the provisions of [the NCAA] constitu-
tion or the bylaws,"'13 8 (3) "[r]eport its proceedings to the general busi-
ness session of the annual Convention,"1 3 9 (4) "[mlake interpretations
of the constitution and bylaws in the interim between Conventions," 1
40
(5) "[r]eview and approve policies and procedures governing the admin-
istration of the enforcement program,"' 14 1 (6) "[a]dopt administrative
regulations for the efficient implementation of the Association's general
legislative policies, 142 and (7) "[f]ill vacancies that occur among the of-
ficers of the Association or on the Council, the Executive Committee or
other committees of the Association [for the unexpired term]."'
14 3
While this executive power does not dwarf the legislative power of the
membership as expressed by the delegates voting in convention, it does
provide for significant express power and also is a source of perhaps
even greater implied power. The implied power is a function of the fact
that members of the Council have access to and can create information
through the committee process. 144 Members of the Council are very
involved in overseeing the day-to-day operations of the NCAA and gain
the power of information by virtue of that immersion. As any lawyer
knows, information is central to persuasion. As such, the Council is for-
137. NCAA CONSTITUTION, art. IV, § 4.1.3 (a), reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note
16, at 19.
138. Id. at (b).
139. Id. at (c).
140. Id. at (d).
141. Id. at (e).
142. Id. at ().
143. Id. at (g).
144. See, e.g., NCAA CONSTITUTION, art. IV, § 4.1.1., reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra
note 16, at 17-19.
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midable, both in terms of its expressed powers and in terms of its im-
plied power of persuasion and access to and control over information.
The Council historically has not been at the forefront of reform. In
the 1990 convention, the Council again indicated its opposition to as-
pects of the Presidents Commission's rather modest reform propos-
als. 14 5 While much of the Council's opposition to the Commission's
proposals was well-founded, 146 it is sad that the Council has never used
its authority to work to devise a coherent package of major reforms that
would help to instill academic integrity in big-time intercollegiate athlet-
ics. Given this lack of inspired direction on the part of the Council, ef-
forts to reform the governance structure, like those espoused by
President Coor, 1 4 7 should be given serious consideration. More impor-
tantly, perhaps, efforts should be made to strengthen both the express
power of other entities such as the Presidents Commission, which by the
nature of their membership, are more inclined to promote reforms sup-
portive of academic integrity and their implied power in terms of access
to information. In the following sections, I discuss how the power of
other entities or groups might be augmented to stimulate meaningful
substantive reform efforts.
(3) The Presidents Commission
It has repeatedly been asserted that the presidents must become
"proactive rather than passive participants"' 48 in the governance of in-
tercollegiate athletics. The Presidents Commission was formed in 1984
for just that purpose. 149 While the presidents were unable to gain veto
power over NCAA legislation, they did gain significant power relative to
the legislative process, 150 and were ultimately granted a veto over the
selection of the Executive Director of the NCAA, when Schultz was
selected. 15'
Despite being given this power, the Presidents Commission has had
a checkered history, in terms of its ability to shape the direction of
NCAA legislation. For example, it was fairly successful in 1985, when it
strengthened penalties for noncompliance with NCAA rules. At that
time, the presidents effectively sponsored what has been referred to as
145. See, e.g., Lederman, NCAA Council Refuses to Back Presidents' Call Limits on Football,
Basketball Seasons, The Chron. of Higher Educ., Oct. 25, 1989, at A35, col. 3.
146. The presidents often act rashly and symbolically without thinking much about the
ramifications of their actions. See infra notes 178-95 and accompanying text, for a discus-
sion of this weakness and the need for more attention to detail on the part of the presi-
dents. Nevertheless, the Council has never initiated a major package of reforms on its
own, perhaps because it tends to reflect the interests of the rank and file membership of
the NCAA delegates, which has been heavily dominated by athletic directors and coaches,
or their supporters, who tend to support the status quo.
147. See discussion, supra note 133 and accompanying text.
148. LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 180.
149. For a discussion regarding the history of the Presidents Commission, see Smith,
Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 997-1000.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1000 n. 85.
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the "death penalty" for repeat, major infractions of NCAA rules. 15 2 In
1987, however, in its push for cost-containment, the Presidents Com-
mission was "finessed"' 153 and due to lack of preparation suffered one
legislative defeat after another at the hands of the anti-reform forces
marshalled by coaches and athletic directors.' 5 4 In 1990, the Presidents
Commission again enjoyed marginal success in terms of gaining support
for three reforms it had sponsored. The 1990 reforms dealt with a par-
tial repeal of financial-aid restrictions for freshmen athletes at the Divi-
sion I level, a requirement that Divisions I and II publish graduation
rates, and a limit on the length of the playing and practice seasons in
basketball. The limit finally agreed upon by the delegates was less than
that which had been sought by the presidents and came only after a
"rancorous, five-and-a-half hour debate and intense arm-twisting by sev-
eral members of the [Presidents Commission].-i
155
The Presidents Commission has experienced a checkered record for
a number of reasons. First, presidents simply have lacked the will to act
decisively.1 56 Second, the Presidents Commission has not been as pre-
pared as it should be in making its arguments for reform and has been
outmatched by those who are directly concerned with and involved in
the administration of intercollegiate athletics. 15 7 Third, since they often
operate as crisis managers and are unable to give extensive and continu-
ous attention to all matters related to higher education, intercollegiate
athletics have received, at best, sporadic attention from the presi-
dents. 158 Finally, there is some perception that the presidents "are too
politic a class of men [and women] to take any really effective steps
against an enterprise that brings in such large sums of money"' 15 9 and
public attention to their respective institutions. This final problem may
explain, in part, the reason why presidents tend to be intransigent and
why reforms are sporadic and focus more on cost-containment than re-
form to achieve academic purposes.
The first three reasons why the presidents have not been as effective
as had been hoped in bringing academic reform to intercollegiate athlet-
ics are somewhat related and may be cured by strengthening staff and
related support, at the NCAA level, for the Presidents Commission.
Lack of will, failure to prepare, and the president's role as crisis man-
152. See, e.g., Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45.
153. For a discussion of the resounding defeat suffered by the Presidents Commission
during the summer of 1987, see Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32, at 423.
154. Id.
155. Lederman, NCAA Adopts 3 Mlajor Rules Changes Endorsed by Presidents' Panel, The
Chron. of Higher Educ., Jan. 17, 1990, at Al, col. 4.
156. See, e.g., Commission Receives Advisory Committee Statement, The NCAA News, Aug. 2,
1989, at 1, col. 4. The Presidents Commission Advisory Committee concluded that:
[T]here remains a concern that the involvement of the Commission and of chief
executives in general is not as effective as it could be. For the most part, this is
due to (1) a lack of effectiveness by the Commission in communicating its posi-
tions and building support for them among other CEOs, and (2) CEOs' failure in
general to exercise the authority that they hold in the existing NCAA procedures.
157. See Smith, Sixth Special Convention, snpra note 32, at 423.
158. Id. See also, Smith, Death Penalv, supra note 45, at 998.
159. H.L. Mencken, cited ii LPctluCK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 185.
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ager, all might be mitigated by increased institutional support for the
Presidents Commission. Such support could come in various forms, in-
cluding the creation of a number of full time staff positions reporting
directly to the Presidents Commission,. 60 special committees of inter-
ested and dedicated presidents, and increasing presidential authority
and accountability within the NCAA governance process by giving the
Presidents Commission a veto over legislative action taken in
convention.
The final problem - that of the pressures of economics and public
attention - may be more intractable. It takes an extraordinary presi-
dent to be willing to enforce academic values when he or she must do so
at the risk of losing revenues or the public attention that the institution
may gain through the operation of its big-time intercollegiate athletics
program. Nevertheless, I continue to maintain that it is more likely that
such obstacles to reform can be addressed by conscientious presidents
at the national level, where there is some insulation from institutional
pressures, 16 1 than by a single president at the institutional level. Thus,
as the Presidents Commission experiences some success, the buffer be-
tween the pressure felt at the institutional level and the president's de-
sire to further academic purposes may be increased by providing the
president with a set of national rules which mandate compliance. Of
course, such a buffer could be greatly enhanced by requiring accredita-
tion of the athletics program at individual institutions. Indeed, presi-
dents and deans alike understand that accreditation demands can be
very beneficial in efforts to ensure the kind of academic program they
favor by putting pressure on institutional constituencies that oppose
those efforts.
(4) Conference
In addition to structural changes at the national level, conferences
are beginning to take actions that would enhance academic values in the
operation of intercollegiate athletics at the conference level. For exam-
ple, one conference recently agreed to give advertisers a rebate if the
schools within the conference failed to graduate all eligible basketball
players, 162 the presidents in the PAC-10 Conference recently decided to
eliminate their conference basketball tournament at the cost of approxi-
mately $700,000, in terms of lost revenues to the conference, as a token
of their commitment to academic values by lessening demands on the
student-athlete's time,' 63 the chief executive officers of the Southern
Conference recently met to begin to consider conference-level re-
160. See Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32, at 455-57.
161. See discussion supra note 69 and accompanying text.
162. MAAC Links Corporate Sponsor Payments to Graduation Rate, The NCAA News, Dec.
11, 1989, at 17, col. I (discussing the M.A.A.C.'s linkage of advertising to graduation
rates).
163. Kelley, PAC-IOs Decision to Drop Tournament Praiseworthy, The NCAA News, Dec. 27,
1989, at 4, col. I [hereinafter cited as Kelly, PAC-JO's Decision].
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forms, 16 4 the Atlantic Coast Conference is expected to initiate a reform
effort directed at cutting costs and relieving time pressures on ath-
letes,' 6 5 and the Big 10 chief executive officers recently acted to support
a ban on freshmen eligibility, although they stressed that they would not
act alone as a conference.16 6
As illustrated by the conditional action of the Big 10 in banning
freshmen eligibility only if other conferences follow suit, reform at the
conference level is more difficult to bring to fruition than is reform at
the national level. This is particularly true because of the "level playing
field" or equity in athletics competition concept. As such, if a confer-
ence were to initiate major reform in furtherance of academic values, it
might adversely impact on the ability of schools within the conference to
recruit student-athletes and to compete with schools outside the confer-
ence that do not adhere to equally stringent requirements. Neverthe-
less, some conferences may be willing to initiate academically related
reforms in order to place their institutions in a positive academic light in
the media.
As a structural matter, there are some things that can be done na-
tionally and at the conference level to increase the impetus for reform in
furtherance of academic values. Nationally, economic and other incen-
tives can be given to conferences and institutions willing to engage in
meaningful reform. For example, the NCAA might provide funds to
support particular efforts designed to further academic values at both
conference and institutional levels. Similarly, the conference might pro-
vide its members with economic and related incentives to engage in
meaningful reform at the institutional level. Economic incentives could
be used as rewards for successes in areas such as graduation rates, as aid
for schools within the conference that have more competitive admission
standards than other conference members, and as support for programs
designed to further academic values.
Efforts at the conference level should be supported both nationally
and at the institutional level. Indeed, a combined effort at reform could
create the momentum necessary to ensure that meaningful reform pack-
age is initiated and enacted.
(5) Board of Trustees
When one turns from the national and conference levels to the in-
stitutional level, one must look first to the Board of Trustees in examin-
ing what kinds of changes might be made to enhance the academic
values that ought to inhere in big-time intercollegiate athletics pro-
164. Southern CEO'S Seek Bigger Sports Role, The NCAA News, Nov. 13, 1989, at 13, col. 3.
It should be noted, however, that the suggestions were quite weak in terms of their likely
capacity to generate meaningful reform.
165. The A.C.C. announced that, during the spring of 1990, it would "adopt a series of
league-wide changes designed to cut costs and relieve pressures on athletes." The Chron.
of Higher Educ.. Jan. 17, 1990, at A39, col. 2.
166. Big Ten CEO's Back More to Bar Freshmen, The NCAA NewsJune 21, 1989, at 4, col.
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grams. As Director Schultz recently noted, the Board of Trustees or
governing board is ultimately responsible for everything at a university,
including intercollegiate athletics.
1 67
The degree of potential involvement on the part of a governing
board in the administration of a big-time intercollegiate athletics pro-
gram was demonstrated during the woes experienced by SMU during
the 1970s and much of the 1980s. 168 In the Report to the Board of
Trustees of SMU from the Committee of Bishops, it was noted that Pres-
idents Zumberge and Shields "were the administrators of the University
during their respective terms, but Cox, Stewart and Clements (board
members) were the 'leadership.' And it was clear that the administrators
reported to and were responsible to that leadership."' 16 9 Indeed, at one
juncture, President Shields reported that Clements told him "to 'stay
out of [athletics]' and 'go run the university'."' 170
The SMU experience amply demonstrates that the governing board
ultimately is responsible for intercollegiate athletics. Of course, at most
institutions the-board may take a far less aggressive role in terms of the
operation of the intercollegiate athletics program. However, the fact
that governing boards can be passive in exercising their responsibility to
oversee the operation of the athletics program at their institution does
not absolve them of their responsibility. Indeed, as was concluded in
the SMU report, the board must exercise "reasonable care and diligent
inquiry" in overseeing the operation of the athletics program at their
institution. 
171
Given that the governing board ought to be responsible for over-
sight, it would be appropriate to hold them to a duty of care in the exer-
cise of their oversight function. Under NCAA rules, it is arguable that
members of a governing board can and, I believe, should be held ac-
countable in exercising their duty of care to oversee the operations of
their athletics program. 172 Certainly, the NCAA could require that a
particular member of a governing board dissassociate himself or herself
from a program if he or she has either "engaged in or condoned a major
violation [of NCAA rules]."' 7 3 Some states have also passed legislation
167. Schultz noted that, "The message has to start with the governing board at each
university that it is responsible for the integrity of everything that goes on at the university,
including intercollegiate athletics." Quoted in Franckling, Athletics Suffer From Lack of Direc-
lion, Purpose, Yow Says, The NCAA News, July 5, 1989 at 5, col. 3.
168. See SMU REPORT, supra note 71, at 14.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 18.
171. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1026-27, arguing that the language of the
repeat violator (death penalty) legislation is broad enough to cover presidents. Similarly,
it could be construed to cover board members. It is clear that board members, as repre-
sentatives of an institution's athletics interests, could be dissassociated under § 19.4.2.6 of
the NCAA Bylaws, which provides in pertinent part that: "'Ithe dissassociation of rela-
tions with a representative of an institution's athletics interests may be imposed on a per-
manent basis, for the duration of the applicable probationary period or for another
specified period of time ..." reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 270.
172. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 270.
173. See, e.g., Section 10.1 of 1989 Nev. ALS 382; 1989 Nev. Ch. 382; 1989 Nev.
AB563, which provides that:
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that would possibly make such actions by members of a governing board
actionable, either civilly or criminally. 174 Such efforts to hold board
members accountable are laudable and are analogous to notions of re-
sponsibility and accountability that exist in the corporate area.
175
Holding board members accountable for what they know and con-
done, explicitly or- implicitly, and for what they should have known, in
terms of the operation of their institution's athletics program, will help
to ensure that academic values are furthered in intercollegiate athletics.
Certainly, board members cannot be expected to oversee intercollegiate
athletics on a daily basis, but they can be expected to require their presi-
dent to report to them on a regular basis with regard to the operation of
the university's athletics program. Relatedly, they can require that the
president and the athletics staff execute contracts that mandate such re-
porting and that provide for dismissal in the event that there is a major
infraction of NCAA rules on the part of the athletics department. Such a
reporting system, particularly if a level of specificity is demanded and is
coupled with contractual accountability, will have a decided "trickle
down" effect, requiring the president to exercise his or her oversight
more closely and creating a closer relationship between the athletics de-
partment and the president. It might also help to ensure that the board
will support the president in taking decisive action against an errant
coach or athletics department.' 
76
In addition to holding members of the board accountable, some
structural changes might be invoked that would further academic values
in the operation of intercollegiate athletics programs. First, it would be
helpful for the board to delineate their own responsibility and the re-
sponsibility of the president and others with regard to oversight of the
intercollegiate athletics program. 177
Second, and relatedly, the board should require a written report
each year regarding the operation of the intercollegiate athletics pro-
gram at their institution. The basic form for that report - the questions
to be answered - might be provided by the NCAA itself and should
require the president and the athletics department, and all personnel
A person who causes a student athlete or an institution to violate a rule of the
National Collegiate Athletic Association to which the institution is a member, or
aids in any such violation, is liable to the institution for damages... if:
(a) The person knew or reasonably should have known that a rule was vio-
lated or would be violated; or
(b) The violation of the rule is a contributing cause of:
(1) Disciplinary action, including loss of eligibility, taken by the institu-
tion against a student athlete; or
(2) Disciplinary action taken by the National Collegiate Athletic Asso-
ciation against the institution or a student athlete.
174. See, e.g., Fletcher, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, Vol. 3,
§ 838 at 177-203. Fletcher notes that, "[a] director can be liable for a violation of the
fiducary duty even in the absence of bad faith or dishonesty; affirmative malfeasance is not
required. Mere passive negligence can be enough to breach the duty and result in liabil-
ity." Id. at 181.
175. See Oliva, supra note 20, and AGB REPORT, supra note 86.
176. See, e.g., recommendations to this effect in SMU REPORT, supra note 71, at 46-47.
177. LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at xxix.
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therein, to respond to questions regarding the values and functions ac-
tually furthered by intercollegiate athletics at their institution, including
performing arts, research-like functions, building of character, develop-
ment of a sense of community, and the furtherance of educational values
related to student-athletes involved in the athletics program. The mate-
rial regarding students should include information as to the academic
progress of each athlete, graduation rates, academic support, time spent
in practice and preparation for performance by the student-athlete in his
or her sport, and a section dealing with the treatment of student-athletes
by their coaches. This final series of questions would be designed to
ascertain whether the coach emotionally abuses his or her athletes. The
questions included on the report form should be designed to require
specific answers and to provide the board with detailed information
about the operation of the athletics program. The form also might be
used as a part of the long-range planning effort for the athletics pro-
gram. Such a questionnaire would fit in nicely with the idea of an aca-
demic accreditation process for athletics programs and would give the
board and the president alike access to information that would heighten
the direct responsibility of both the president and the board. Finally, in
conjunction with the filing of the questionnaire, an annual audit of the
athletics program should be provided, which audit would cover income
and expenses from all sources, including coaches' income from all
sources. All items on the report should be certified, acknowledged or
declared under penalty of perjury, by members of the athletics depart-
ment and the continuation of the contracts of all those involved in ath-
letics should be conditioned upon the filing of an accurate report.
As closer ties are created between the board, the president and the
athletics department, institutional governance of athletics can be di-
rected to the furtherance of academic values. Where institutions fall
short of academic objectives, despite the use of such a reporting system,
there will be fewer questions as to whom is responsible. In exercising its
responsibility, the board must support the president in his or her efforts
to effectuate academic values in the operation of an intercollegiate ath-
letics program, even when that means firing an otherwise popular coach,
or retaining a coach who is under pressure after having suffered through
a season in which he or she has won fewer games than fans and others
momentarily may demand.
(6) Presidents
As is obvious from the preceding section, the board must work
closely with the presidents of the various universities. Indeed, given the
president's proximity, on a daily basis, to all that goes on at his or her
institution, the president clearly is directly responsible for the operation
of the athletics program at his or her institution. Of course, the presi-
dent cannot actually run the athletics program, but he or she can engage
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in more "delegation with accountability."' 78 Indeed, the most oft-
shirked responsibility of presidents is to "know what is going on [in the
operation of their athletics program]."' 179 As the SMU report con-
cluded, the president must be involved in "active surveillance" and can-
not stand by as a "passive sentry."'18 0
Not everyone agrees that the president must be more proactive,
however. Bo Schembechler, former football coach and athletics director
at the University of Michigan, recently asserted, with regard to the
Big 10 presidents' actions relative to the possibility of adding Penn State
University to the conference, that, "[t]his confirms the worst fear I have
of presidents getting too much control in athletics ..... Making deci-
sions like this without ever studying it is terrible. Not one athletic direc-
tor was consulted on this matter. How can they do that?" 18 1
Schembechler has been even more emphatic with regard to his negative
views relative to the involvement of presidents in reforming athletics.
He has stated that, "[i]n the next five years, the presidents will com-
pletely confuse the field of intercollegiate athletics. Then, they'll dump
it on the athletics director and say, '[y]ou straighten this out.' Then,
about the year 2,000, it may be back on track again."' 182 This attitude is
often reflected in battles between the athletic directors, who align with
coaches, and presidents over the nature of and need for reform in inter-
collegiate athletics. 1
83
Given the movement toward reform in intercollegiate athletics, one
is inclined to disregard views like those expressed by Coach
Schembechler, which seem to imply that all is well in intercollegiate ath-
letics and that reform-minded intervention on the part of the presidents
is uncalled for. However, there is some truth in what the athletic direc-
tors and coaches assert. Presidents often are ill-prepared and act rashly,
without considering the implications of their actions for the day-to-day
operations of the athletics programs. 184 Even the recently enacted re-
form limiting the number of basketball games played during the season
fails to consider the impact of lost revenues on the operations of athlet-
ics programs at institutions that have come to depend on those funds.18 5
Thus, without much foresight, presidents can place contradictory de-
mands on athletic directors: for example, on the one hand, presidents
178. Id.
179. SMU REPORT, supra note 71, at 166.
180. Id. at 46.
181. Scorecard, Sports Illustrated, Jan. 1, 1990, at 21.
182. Comment, The NCAA News, Jan. 3, 1990, at 4, col. 1.
183. In commenting on the battles between athletic directors (and coaches) the presi-
dents at the 1990 NCAA Convention, one reporter concluded, "the effort required to pass
[the reform measures adopted] pointed up deep rooted differences in priorities that exist
between academic and athletic interests in intercollegiate athletics." Rhoden, VCAA Re-
stricts Practices, Seasons, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1990, at B9, col. 5 [hereinafter Rhoden].
184. See Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32.
185. DeLoss Dodds, Athletic Director at Texas, argued against cutting the number of
basketball games on economic grounds: "How can you make that [projected loss of
$150,000 per game] up?" Rhoden, supra note 183. See also Kelley, PAC-IO's Decision, supra
note 163.
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demand a balanced athletics budget and an athletics program'that pro-
vides access for women and others who participate in non-revenue pro-
ducing sports; whereas, on the other hand, they take actions that
significantly cut revenues available to run a broad-based athletics pro-
gram on a balanced budget. Unfortunately, too often, by its very nature,
the office of president demands that a president be a crisis manager,
ever mindful of public pressures that ebb and flow. Presidents often are
inclined to make hasty decisions, in moving from one crisis to another,
seeking symbolic rather than substantive solutions. As President
Slaughter recently acknowledged, "[n]o President or Chancellor can af-
ford to spend the vast amounts of time and energy required to watch
over any one part of the campus operation on a constant basis."'
186
Consequently, complaints by conscientious athletic directors are often
legitimate.
Presidents should exercise more oversight and should play a major
role in reform efforts, by virtue of their position as academic leaders at
their respective institutions, 18 7 although there are some structural
changes that can assist them in doing so in a more reflective and coher-
ent manner. Presidents, like all decisionmakers, are greatly assisted
when they receive accurate information and are privy to ideas generated
by those who have more time to reflect on the issues that are before
them. As such, presidents should seek information and should develop
structures within their respective institutions that would enhance the re-
trieval of such information. That could be done, in significant part, by
use of the kind of questionnaire suggested in the preceding section. 188
Use of that questionnaire, together with more attention to the self-study
process required by the NCAA,' 89 should help generate necessary infor-
mation. The president can also enhance his or her access to information
and involvement in the daily operations of the athletics program by ap-
pointing a balanced athletic board' 90 that can provide an informed
counterpoint to the athletic director and by selecting an independent-
minded and conscientious institutional representative to the NCAA it-
self.19 1 Finally, the president should appoint someone in the general
186. LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 190.
187. See Schultz's State of the Association address in The NCAA News,Jan. 25, 1989, at
3, col. 3.
188. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
189. See NCAA CONST., art. VI, § 6.3, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16 at 40-41.
The president should closely monitor the self-study process rather than treating it per-
functorily as just another minor administrative aggravation.
190. See NCAA CONST., art. VI, § 6.1.2, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 39.
An athletics board is not required under NCAA rules, but should be utilized. Administra-
tive and/or faculty and staff members are to make up a majority of the board, and the
president could do much to strengthen his or her oversight responsibility by appointing
capable, independent faculty and staff to the board.
191. NCAA CONST., art. VI, § 6.1.3, provides that:
A member institution shall designate an individual to serve as faculty athletics
representative. An individual so designated after January 12, 1989, shall be a
member of the institution's faculty or an administrator who holds faculty rank and
shall not hold an administrative or coaching position in the athletics department.
Duties of the faculty athletics representative shall be determined by the member
institution.
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counsel's office to oversee intercollegiate athletics, both from a compli-
ance point of view and for the sake of reviewing institutional planning
efforts in the athletics area. Since the president cannot be immersed in
what is going on in the athletics department on a daily basis, he or she
must appoint individuals of differing views, all of whom adhere to the
importance of academic values, to positions of authority in the institu-
tional governance of intercollegiate athletics. In turn, those individuals
can provide the president with helpful information and insight into the
operation of the athletics program. Decisions, which necessarily must
be made in the haste that characterizes the life of a college or university
president, can then be made in an environment that enhances rather
than detracts from thoughtful decisionmaking.
As presidents are held responsible, at the institutional, as well as the
NCAA and state and federal levels, 19 2 for the operation of their athletics
program, they will no doubt demand closer administrative ties between
themselves and their athletics programs. Surprisingly, it may turn out
that those closer ties will strengthen rather than weaken the relationship
between the athletic directors and coaches and presidents, because
channels of communication will have been opened. In this regard, it
should be recalled that Coach Schembechler's concern with the action of
the presidents in proposing to add Penn State to the Big 10 was based
on the fact that the presidents never consulted the athletic directors
before making their announcement. Such rash action on the part of the
presidents indicates both a lack of communication and a paucity of plan-
ning. With a stronger institutional framework, and more sense of per-
sonal responsibility, the presidents may enhance rather than detract
from their relationship with the athletics department.
To further enhance the relationship between the president and ath-
letics personnel, the president should clearly delineate the responsibility
of athletics personnel. There should be no hidden agenda 19 3 and the
institutional expectations should be clearly stated and consistent with
academic values. 1
94
Finally, if such structural changes are to mean anything in the long
run, at the institutional level, presidents must receive support from
those within the institution, including the board, athletics personnel,
faculty, and students, as well as those interested in but outside of the
institution, including alumni, friends, media, etc.
192. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1026-36.
193. See, e.g., Looney, The Ax Falls at Toledo, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,Jan. 1, 1990, at 32-33,
for an article discussing the firing of a successful coach, successful both in terms of his
winning record and in terms of the graduation rate of his players. In such a case, the
hidden agenda is articulated less in words or contractual provisions and more in an im-
plicit demand to win more games.
194. The contract between the coach and the university should be explicit and should
be adhered to by the president as well as the coach. In the academic world, breach of or
institutional refusal to comply with a contract may carry moral and educational as well as
economic implications.
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(7) Athletic Directors
In numerous instances, rather than working closely with their presi-
dents to maintain academic integrity in the operation of their athletics
program, athletic directors have taken a confrontational stance vis-a-vis
their presidents. At times, the level of confrontation reaches a heated
pitch and becomes public, as it did when the athletic directors and
others closely tied to intercollegiate athletics departments did battle
over issues regarding the length of the basketball season during the
1990 Convention 19 5 and over cost-containment issues during the
NCAA's Sixth Special Convention held during the summer of 1987.196
As indicated in the preceding section, part of the fault for this con-
tinuing confrontation lies with the presidents who tend to be ill-pre-
pared and fail to consider the ramifications of their actions for the
overall athletics program. However, as the presidents make adjustments
of a structural nature, at the institutional, conference and national
levels, and as they develop more of a will to be general overseers of the
athletics programs - assuming, of course, that they do so - athletic
directors will increasingly be held accountable for what occurs within
their departments. As Doug Single correctly concluded, "[ifn compli-
ance matters, directors of athletics occupy the most important leader-
ship position within intercollegiate athletics."'
9 7
The presidents and governing boards must become more willing to
engage in preventative, rather than after-the-fact punitive action. When
they do so, it remains to be asked what they can do to ensure a better
working relationship with athletic directors and compliance with rules
and academic values in the operation of their athletics programs. To
begin with, as has been previously noted, lines of responsibility can be
strengthened by creating and enforcing more stringent reporting re-
quirements and by contractual accountability.
In terms of reporting, the athletic director should be required to
report on a regular basis to the president or his or her designate with
regard to budgetary issues, coaching performance, peculiar time de-
mands related to participation in the athletics program by student-ath-
letes, academic progress of student-athletes, academic support for
student-athletes, and items related to compliance with NCAA and con-
ference rules. They should also report with regard to the institution's
general or macro philosophy of athletics.
In reporting on coaching performance, athletic directors should
have to treat the coaching profession much as academic chairs treat
other teaching positions. Professors are evaluated with regard to their
ability as teachers and scholars. Similarly, coaches should be evaluated
with regard to their technical ability as coaches and their ability as teach-
195. See Rhoden, supra note 183.
196. See Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32, at 430.
197. LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 159.
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ers. If we have student-athletes, then we ought to have teacher-coaches.1 98
Unfortunately, coaches are often evaluated solely on the basis of their
technical ability as coaches and recruiters and not on their ability as
teachers. It is clear that many coaches may have excellent technical abil-
ity or the ability to recruit fine athletes, but it does not follow that they
are equally as able in terms of their teaching ability. Of course, teaching
is difficult to evaluate in any academic discipline,' 9 9 but concrete effort
is made to do so in other academic areas, as it should be. Developing
criteria or standards for the teaching side of coaching will not be easy,
but such efforts will help us to face certain issues, including the tension
between teaching discipline and emotional abuse of players.2 0 0 Like the
head of any other department, the athletic director must be concerned
about the quality of teaching within his or her department.
Athletic directors should also be required to report regarding time
constraints placed on student-athletes. The director of athletics should
assess time demands for the purpose of overseeing the scheduling of
games during the season and practice times. In addition to overseeing
practice demands during the season, athletic directors should also ex-
amine off-season demands for training and other purposes. Like his or
her counterpart in other departments, the athletic director is ultimately
responsible for insuring that demands placed on the student-athletes are
reasonable.
The director of athletics should also exercise oversight and, per-
haps, even direct efforts in the areas of academic progress and academic
support for student-athletes. 20 1 In doing so, the athletic director should
be concerned with the academic needs of student-athletes. The athletic
director must insure that tutorial and other academic support programs
are run with integrity, particularly given the potential conflict of interest
that may exist between the coach who wants a particular athlete to be
eligible and the student-athlete's academic needs. This may require that
the academic support programs be wholly integrated with academic sup-
port programs within the university, or if an athletic director is account-
able, personally and institutionally, it may be possible to have an
academic support program with integrity within the athletics department
that meets the special needs of student-athletes involved in big-time in-
tercollegiate athletics.
20 2
198. The NCAA refers to athletes involved in intercollegiate athletics as student-ath-
letes. They ought to begin to refer to coaches as teacher- or educator-coaches, as well.
199. See, e.g., Teich, Research on American Law Teaching: Is There a Case Against the Case
System?, 36J. LAw ED. 167 (1986), for an analysis of the difficulty of assessing teaching
methodologies in law school (and elsewhere).
200. One of my colleagues refers to the role of the coach as being analogous to the role
of a drill instructor in the military - a molder of disciplined troops. This may be a legiti-
mate role for a coach, but such a determination ought to be made thoughtfully.
201. See infra notes 301-18 and accompanying text, for a discussion regarding the need
to direct academic resources to serve the educational needs of the student-athletes.
202. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Stokes, TheJan Kemp Case. No Penalty
for Pass Interference, 16J. L. & EDUC. 257 (1987). See also LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra
note 43, at 157.
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Finally, an athletic director must report and be held accountable for
compliance with rules regulating the operation of intercollegiate athlet-
ics within his or her department. Under NCAA rules, the athletic direc-
tor is held accountable for the actions of staff members within the
athletics department.20 3 Similarly, the athletic director should be held
strictly accountable under conference rules and institutional procedures.
The athletic director's contract should be designed to hold the di-
rector responsible for the operation of his or her department in the ar-
eas of teacher-coach responsibility, time and related demands placed on
student-athletes, academic progress and academic support, and basic
rules compliance. Reporting specific information in each of these areas
will help maintain clear lines of responsibility. Such reporting also
should be combined with the delineation of the athletic director's spe-
cific duties, in these areas, in his or her contract with the institution.
Together with strengthening reporting and contractual responsibil-
ities on the part of the athletic director, it is imperative that the athletics
department budget be tied to the university budget. 20 4 With budgets in
the millions of dollars, 20 5 athletics departments can be subjected to eco-
nomic enticements that can lure them away from academic values.
Budgetary responsibility and control must be invoked at the university-
wide level to help insure that the institution's academic values are not
compromised. If values were compromised under such a system, it
would also be clear that the president and the board would be responsi-
ble, along With the athletic director. Additionally, by tying the athletics
budget to the university budget, presidents and others will be more in-
clined to understand the budgetary constraints or ramifications that ac-
company some of their decisions.
(8) Coaches
As athletic directors have administrative responsibility for the oper-
ation of the athletics department as a whole, the individual coach has
direct responsibility for his or her team members. Like the athletic di-
rectors, coaches have had conflicts with their presidents relative to the
operation of their teams. Indeed, given their status as prominent public
figures, coaches often are able to win public confrontations with a less-
well-known president. 20 6 For example, when the President at the Uni-
203. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1036-50.
204. See Atwell's comments in The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 4, col. 3.
205. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 989 and Wojcienchowski, Notre Dame's
Deal Shouldn't be a Shock, L.A. Times, Feb. 8, 1990, at Cl, col. 4, noting that Notre Dame
recently signed a contract worth $40 million for the televising of its football games. Notre
Dame exerted control over the use of the television revenues and directed them to aca-
demic purposes, although it is sad to note that Notre Dame diverted those funds away
from the academic needs of the student-athletes who generated them.
206. See, e.g., Lederman, North Carolina State University Professors Debate Faculty Role in Bas-
ketball Scandal, Vow More Vigilant Oversight, The Chron. of Higher Educ., Sept. 13, 1989, at
A39, col. 2 [hereinafter N.C. State]. (Following North Carolina State University's "scan-
dal," Chancellor Bruce R. Poulton was forced to resign, while Coach .Valvano was only
asked to step down from his position as athletic director).
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versity of Iowa recently indicated that he would unilaterally invoke a rule
of freshman ineligibility at Iowa, Hayden Fry, the well-known football
coach, 20 7 said that he would like to "redshirt" the president, 20 8 and
Coach Fry was supported by the Governor of Iowa in his confrontation
with the president.
20 9
Assuming that the presidents, boards and athletic directors begin to
exercise their offices more responsibly, what can be done, as a structural
matter, to ensure that coaches maintain academic integrity at the indi-
vidual team level? Whatever is done must deal directly with the problem
of potentially conflicting demands placed on the coach of a team in-
volved in heavily commercialized intercollegiate sports.
Coaches in big-time intercollegiate athletics programs have little
job security and are subjected to varying and sometimes conflicting de-
mands in terms of the performance of their responsibilities. There is an
unsettling sense the following observation may be accurate: "In college
athletics, there's a hypocrisy that reeks. There's a wear-it-on-your-shirt-
sleeve attitude that what we are here for is to educate people. A lot of
times that is just lip service. The bottom line in college athletics is you'd
better win."12 10 This demand that a coach in a big-time sport win or risk
losing his or her job is tied,2 1 I no doubt, to the fact that big-time sports
are heavily commercialized and are expected to provide revenues to
fund their operation as well as the operation of many nonrevenue pro-
ducing sports. 2 12 Winning teams simply bring in more revenue, reve-
nue needed to fund other programs. At the same time, at least lip
service is given to the need for the coach to further academic values in
the operation of his or her team sport.2 1 3 At times, these sometimes
207. Coach Fry was the football coach at Southern Methodist University for a period of
time in the 1970's, when the football program was riddled with infractions of the NCAA
rules. SMU REPORT, supra note 71, at 14. He is a popular coach, however.
208. See supra note 129.
209. For a discussion of the conflict between Coach Fry and the President, see The
Chron. of Higher Educ., April 19, 1989, at A1, col. 2 and TELANDER, supra note 7, at 190-
91.
210. Lederman, Season-End Firings Send Mlessage to Football Coaches: 'You'd Better Win', The
Chron. of Higher Educ., Jan. 3, 1990, at A33, col. 4 [hereinafter Firings].
211. See also Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1038-39.
212. See Lederman, Firings, supra note 210, at A33, col. 4 (pressure placed on coaches in
big-time revenue-producing sports to provide funds for operating other nonrevenue-pro-
ducing sports).
213. See, e.g., Dixon, supra note 44, at 397, for a discussion of Coach Curry's contract at
the University of Alabama. Coach Curry's contract was tied, in part, to academic perform-
ance. Similarly, in moving from Michigan to Arizona State University, Coach Frieder re-
ceived a contract that included an incentive of $10,000 for graduation rates, but that
incentive was dwarfed by incentives tied to winning and commercial success. The
acacemic incentive in Coach Frieder's contract was miniscule in comparison to incentives
related to winning basketball games. Coach Freider received a salary of $154,000; a guar-
antee of $350,000 in annual income from summer camps, a sneaker company contract and
television and radio deals; $20,000 if his team finishes .500 or better or has a recruiting
class in the top 20; $20,000 if the Sun Devils win at least ten conference games; an extra
week's salary if they win one game in the conference tournament or get a N.I.T. bid; two
week's additional salary if they get an NCAA berth; three week's salary if they reach the
NCAA regionals; four week's salary if they reach the "Final Four;" five week's salary if they
win the National Championship; $20,000 if the average attendance at home games is at
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conflicting messages create confusion on the part of the coach as to his
or her job responsibilities.
With pressures to win and produce revenues being given highest
priority, there is a sense that intercollegiate athletics have become
professionalized and resemble more an entertainment industry than an
educational enterprise. 2 14 This professionalization of intercollegiate
athletics is hardly new. With the risk, in terms of job security, that ac-
companies this professionalization of intercollegiate sports, select
coaches who are able to win with regularity at major programs are re-
warded economically. Indeed, a successful coach may make well in ex-
cess of $300,000 per year from all athletics-related sources. 2 15 As such,
coaching salaries often exceed those of the president and are the highest
in all of higher education.
This professionalization of the coaching profession at the big-time
level has led to a denigration, or at least confusion, as to the coach's role
with regard to academic values in the coaching profession. A coach gen-
erally knows that he or she must "win," and reap a bounteous economic
harvest, but the need to adhere to other values is far less clear.
2 16 It
would appear that often the coach is called upon primarily to be a busi-
ness person and coach and only secondarily, if at all, to be a teacher.
Even though institutions may not emphasize the teaching side of coach-
ing, it is clear that student-athletes are greatly influenced by their
coaches. 2 17 Given this influence, an institution hypocritically abdicates
its responsibility when it fails to place some emphasis on the coach as a
teacher.
Structurally, action must be taken to help redirect the focus of the
coaching profession. On the economic side, presidents are right when
they assert the need for cost-containment to help in this effort, although
cost-containment initiatives often seem to be ill-conceived in terms of
their capacity to further academic values directly.2 18 However, there are
numerous other actions that may produce even more effective results:
placing emphasis on responsibility of the coach as a teacher; increasing
job security at the same time that an institution engages in cost-contain-
ment; and, providing for stricter enforcement of ethical standards and
rules compliance on the part of the coach.
In the previous section, I discussed the importance of emphasizing
least 7,500; $30,000 if the average attendance is at least 11,000. See Extra extra Incentive,
The National Sports Daily, Feb. 1, 1990, at 28, col. 3.
214. Telander argues, for example, that, "[m]oney, received for providing vicarious
thrills to viewers, is what drives college football these days." TEIANDER, supra note 7, at
25.
215. See, e.g., Poskanzer, Spotlight on the Coaching Boa'. The Role of the Athletics Coach Wlithin
the Academic Institution, 16J.C. & U.L. 1, 2 (1989) and a report that Coach Curry at Alabama
received $500,000 per year in salary and side benefits. N. Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1990, at 30,
col. I.
216. See Lederman, N.C State. supra note 206.
217. See, e.g., Polidoro, Survey Examines Coaches'Concerns About Ethics, The NCAA News.
Nov. 20, 1989, at 4, [hereinafter Polodorol and The NCAA News, Feb. 15. 1989, at 12-17.
218. See Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32.
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the coach's responsibility as a teacher, both in terms of reporting and in
terms of the coach's contractual responsibility. Of course, there are
those who assert that big-time coaches are not teachers. 2 19 However,
athletes involved in big-time sports view their coaches as teachers
although they often feel that their coaches are little concerned with aca-
demic values.
2 20
Given that student-athletes view their coaches as teachers, an insti-
tution acts hypocritically when it fails either to disabuse the student-
athlete of that conception or to change the attitude of the coach. Since I
contend that intercollegiate athletics should be reformed to further aca-
demic values, I will only look at ways in which the attitude of the coach
and others may be changed to conform to the model of coach as teacher.
At the outset, in changing attitudes and direction, one must face the
issue of what is effective teaching on the part of the coach. For example,
some individuals in the coaching profession believe that Bobby Knight,
the head basketball coach at Indiana-Bloomington, engages in "dehu-
manizing" behavior in handling his players. 2 2 1 Indeed, based on a re-
cent NCAA study, student-athletes in many big-time athletics programs
feel that they are often emotionally abused by their coaches.2 2 2 Never-
theless, there are those, including someone as thoughtful as Wilford
Bailey, President of the NCAA, who feel that it would be inappropriate
to conclude too quickly that coaches are engaged in emotional abuse or
dehumanization of their players. 22 3 It is true that standards regarding
teaching, particularly within the coaching profession, are not easy to for-
mulate. There have been efforts to articulate standards in the past,
22 4
but it might be worthwhile for coaches to develop their own contempo-
rary standards. They could then deal with the issue of what constitutes
dehumanization or emotional abuse, as they deal with other less trouble-
some issues related to the coach's responsibility as a teacher.
In addition to their teaching function in the coach-athlete relation-
ship, coaches also perform a teaching function as emissaries of their in-
stitutions. Unfortunately, with increasing media attention and rising
219. TELANDER, supra note 7, at 86.
220. See Polidoro, supra note 217.
221. J. FEINSTEIN, A SEASON ON THE BRINK (1986). See also The Chron. of Higher Educ.,
Jan. 20, 1988, at A37, col. 1 (Comments of Coach Dale Brown).
222. The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 13.
223. Id. at 15.
224. In August of 1952, the American Football Coaches' Association adopted the fol-
lowing code of ethics:
The distinguishing characteristic of a profession is that its members are dedi-
cated to rendering a service to humanity. Personal gain must be of lesser consid-
eration. Those who select football coaching must understand the justification for
football is that it provides spiritual and physical values for those who play it, and
the game belongs, essentially, to the players.
The welfare of the game depends on how the coaches live up to the spirit and
letter of ethical conduct and how coaches remain ever mindful of the high trust
and confidence placed in them by their players and by the public.
Coaches unwilling or unable to comply with the principles of the Code of
Ethics have no place in the profession.
Cited in LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 138.
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tempers in the heat of athletic battle, many coaches have engaged in
angry theatrics that detract from their teaching function. Anyone who
has observed the antics of some coaches, from the throwing of chairs to
profusions of public profanity, is well aware that coaches sometimes pro-
vide a negative image. As public representatives of their respective insti-
tutions, coaches necessarily are teachers and must be held to higher
standards. Like other teaching standards, standards of public conduct
ought to be included in the coach's contract. In my view, such standards
would do little to chill the coach's capacity to perform his or her legiti-
mate coaching and teaching responsibilities or their right of expression,
although they might detract from the coach's role as an entertainer. 22 5
Focus on the coach's role as a teacher can be enhanced by clearly
spelling out that responsibility in his or her contract. The contract
should focus on academic values. Coaches' contracts can and often do
include incentives for or requirements that the coach further certain aca-
demic values, including matters such as academic progress, graduation
rates, academic support, monitoring of class attendance. 226 Even where
present, however, incentives are often minimal22 7 and requirements
often remain unenforced if the coach can manage to win. 2 28 Relatedly,
even when a coach is quite successful in terms of academic performance,
jobs can rarely be retained unless wins on the court or field accompany
even the most startling academic success.2 2
9
Thus, there is little hope for much progress on the academic or
teaching front, unless it is included in a package consisting of some cost-
containment and job security for coaches, to reduce pressures placed on
coaches in big-time sports. To enforce academic and teaching values in
coaching, many have advocated that coaches be tenured. 230 Others
have argued for rolling long-term contracts for coaches, 23 1 that would
225. Indeed, Bylaw 11.1.1 of the NCAA rules requires that:
Individuals employed by or associated with a member institution to administer,
conduct or coach intercollegiate athletics shall deport themselves with honesty
and sportsmanship at all times so that intercollegiate athletics as a whole, their
institutions and they, as individuals, represent the honor and dignity of fair play
and the generally recognized high standards associated with wholesome competi-
tive sports.
Reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 46.
226. Dixon, supra note 44, at 396-97.
227. Payments for production of wins and revenues far exceed payments for academic
achievements in the contracts of coaches involved in big-time revenue-producing sports.
See supra note 213.
228. See N.C. State, supra note 206.
229. See LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, and statement made in 1989 by the
President of Miami University of Ohio that "we don't fire coaches because we lose," fol-
lowed by the firing of their football coach in 1990, after a losing season. The Chron.
Higher Educ., Nov. 29, 1989, at A43, col. 1, and Lederman, Firings, supra note 210.
230. See, e.g., Coach Raymond's call for the tenuring of coaches in Opinions, The NCAA
News, Nov. 13, 1989, at 5, col. 2.
231. A "rollover clause" in a coach's contract essentially provides that:
[A] coach always has a commitment from the university for a specific number of
years - a tenure clause for coaches. At the end of each year (or other period),
unless one party notifies the other of the intention not to rollover, the contract's
term extends for another like term so that the total term of the contract is, once
again, x years.
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give them time to develop a program and also would provide them with
job security sufficient to permit them to focus on academic values as well
as the economics of their program. Perhaps the most significant of the
alternatives offered is one proposed by Richard Schultz, the Executive
Director of the NCAA. He suggests that coaches be given "tenure," in
the form of a 5-year rolling contract that can be terminated only for a
major rules infraction on the part of the coach. 23 2 Such a contract, even
if it were widened to provide for dismissal on grounds related to aca-
demic or other purposes, would provide substantial security for a
teacher-coach. The concept has been followed. Coach Bowden, the
football coach at Florida State University, for example, recently was
given just such a contract.
23 3
The contract could be designed to further other academic and cost-
containment objectives, as well. It could limit the time spent by coaches
on outside ventures designed to provide the coach with additional in-
come, but which detract from their efforts as a teacher. It could include
academic progress and support provisions, designed to force the coach
to focus on academic values in handling his or her players. It could even
require that all or a significant portion of outside funds generated by a
coach be used to fund academic support or related programs designed
to assist student-athletes within the athletics program. Laudably, both
Bobby Knight and Dean Smith, basketball coaches at Indiana-Blooming-
ton and North Carolina-Chapel Hill, respectively, allocate all or a signifi-
cant portion of the funds generated from their shoe contracts to
academic, as opposed to personal, uses. 23 4 The University of Virginia
requires that dollars received for shoe contracts be used for academic
purposes. 23 5 Such rules regarding the academic use of funds generated
by a coach in the performance of his or her responsibilities as an em-
ployee of the institution could be mandated by the NCAA. 23 6 Indeed,
the NCAA could do much to further such a redirection of funds gener-
ated by a coach's relationship with the athletics program to academic
purposes, although it might be contended that such action constitutes
an antitrust violation, in that it restrains competition by limiting com-
pensation for coaches. 23 7 Tenure, in any form, will no doubt put pres-
sure on institutions to extract an economic or related quid pro quo from
Stoner and Nogay, The Model University Coaching Contract ("MCC ")." A Better Starting Point for
Your Next Negotiation, 16J.C. & U.L. 43, 47 (1989).
232. Prepared Text of Schultz's Convention Address, The NCAA News, Jan. 10, 1990, at 6,
col. 3.
233. Coach Bowden recently was given a lifetime contract, after having held a 5-year
rollover contract. As reported in Columbus Dispatch, Jan. 5, 1990, at 8, col. 1.
234. Brown, Rubber Sole: Should College Basketball Coaches Accept Sneaker Money?, ENT. &
SPORTS LAW. No. 2, at 5.
235. Id.
236. The NCAA already regulates coaches' contracts in a significant way. See NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 16, at 48-50. It would take little effort, but perhaps a great deal of
support, to revise those sections of the Manual to deal with the use of funds. The NCAA
also might require institutions involved in big-time sports to offer coaches a quidpro quo in
the form of designated 5-year rollover contracts.
237. See, e.g., discussion in WEISTART AND LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS. at 759-76
(1979).
1990] .261
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
the coach.2 38 As such, it might result in cost savings that would limit the
economic risks to both the coach and the institution related to the "win-
at-all-costs" mentality that has pervaded contemporary big-time inter-
collegiate sports. If combined with revenue-sharing for academic pur-
poses, 23 9 it would surely have that effect.
The contract with the coach might also include a covenant not to
compete, or a liquidated damages provision to provide the institution
with compensation for a breach of the contract by the coach. Such a
covenant would limit the attractiveness to an ambitious coach of aban-
doning his players and a program that has provided a long-term con-
tract. This would also help the institution to do better budget planning,
because it could rely on the term of the contract.
Such reforms to assure academic integrity in the coaching profes-
sion will be of little practical impact, even if enacted, unless the institu-
tions have the will to enforce them. For example, North Carolina State
University had a contract provision with Coach Valvano, their basketball
coach, that provided that he could be dismissed and a $500,000 buyout
waived, if major infractions of the NCAA rules occurred in the operation
of his basketball program. However, they lacked the will to enforce
these provisions when it became evident that improprieties had oc-
curred in his program.2 40 Thus, as has been the case with many of the
reforms suggested in this article, a redirection of priorities with regard
to coaches and others in the operation of big-time intercollegiate athlet-
ics can come to fruition only when a game plan, rather than a single
play, for reform is initiated.
(9) Faculty
For such reforms to be viable, faculty must also get more involved
in the operation of intercollegiate athletics at their institutions. Histori-
cally, faculty once exercised extensive control over the operation of their
athletics program.2 4 The shift of authority for the operation of inter-
collegiate athletics away from faculty came in part as a result of a certain
haughtiness and hostility that developed in academic circles for athletics
and athletes.2 4 2 However, there is a growing and welcome sense on
some faculties that the faculty must be more involved in the day-to-day
operation of their athletics programs to ensure that academic integrity is
238. See Golenbock, Jumping Through Hoops: A Quick Course in College Sports Hypocrisy -
And 11 Ways to Deal With It, Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 1989, at CI.
239. See supra note 113 and accompanying text, for a brief discussion regarding the
need for revenue-sharing.
240. Lederman, N.C. State, supra note 206.
Since this article was written, Coach Valvano and North Carolina State have ended a
10-year relationship with a settlement of $238,509.24 on his contract. Coach Valvano can
potentially earn an additional $250,000 to $375,000 off a separate agreement with the
booster club.
Valvano Leaves N.C. State as Suttonjoin Okla. State, USA Today, April 9, 1990, at 7C, col.
4.
241. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45. at 989.
242. LIPSKY, supra note 26, at 6.
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maintained. 24 3
A recent American Association of University Professor's Report
(AAUP) has urged more faculty involvement in the governance of inter-
collegiate athletics. 24 4 In that report, the committee suggested that
faculty take a more active role regarding athletics budgets, selection of
athletics council members, and related matters.2 4 5 In a somewhat simi-
lar vein, the faculty should be more directly involved in the preparation
and analysis of the self-study that must be prepared by the athletics de-
partment and should demand an oversight role with regard to academic
support programs operated by the athletics department. 246
Unfortunately, as was the case with the faculty at SMU, passivity
with regard to the governance of an institution's intercollegiate athletics
program can result in some loss of prestige for an institution's academic
reputation. 24 7 While an otherwise strong institution can regain its repu-
tation, it cannot do so without suffering some lingering tarnish to its
academic image and without actually addressing structural problems
that can become endemic in an athletics program if they are not ad-
dressed early enough. As with experience in other areas, preventive
measures are far less costly than measures relied upon after the damage
has been done. Additionally, as educators, faculty members must be
concerned as an ethical or moral matter as to what is being done in
other departments at their institution relative to the education of their
student body. The athletics department should not be exempt from
faculty scrutiny.
(10) Student-athletes
Support has increasingly been developing for having more student
involvement in the governance of intercollegiate athletics. 24 8 With fur-
ther evidence that student-athletes want to be successful academically,
as students, 24 9 this development is most welcome and represents a sig-
nificant change from the 1950's, when student-athletes were routinely
discouraged from "blowing the whistle" on errant athletics
programs.
2 50
At the national level, Schultz has been a supporter of increased stu-
dent involvement since assuming the position of Executive Director with
243. See, e.g., Lederman, N. C. State. supra note 206, and SMU REPORT, supra note 71.
244. Lederman, AA UP Report Urges Bigger FacultY Role in Governing Sports, The Chron. of
Higher Educ., Jan. 10, 1990, at A 1, col. 2 [hereinafter AA UP Report].
245. Id.
246. See Stokes, supra note 202, at 270, indicating that the lesson to be drawn from th
Jan Kemp case is that there is a need for academic professionals to oversee tutorial and
academic support programs.
247. See SMU REPORT, supra note 71, at 43.
248. See, e.g., THIRD FORUM, supra note 17, at 30; Wilford Bailey's call for incorporating
more effective voice for student-athletes in NCAA processes, id. at 63; and Smith, Death
Penalty, supra note 45, at 1052.
249. Former Indiana University President John Ryan has indicated that research has
shown that the "athletes want to be students." The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 17, col.
3, summarizing and discussing AIR research regarding student-athletes.
250. Oliva, supra note 20, at 11.
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the NCAA. 2 5 1 With Schultz's support, the NCAA recently established a
Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, to be made up of 16 students and
3 members of the NCAA Council. 2 52 This Committee is designed to
provide student-athletes with input into NCAA governance.
While a student-athlete advisory committee falls far short of sugges-
tions that student-athletes be appointed personal representation before
the Infractions Committee of the NCAA, a model based on the public
defender system used in our criminal system, 2 5 3 and be permitted to be
directly involved in the NCAA legislative and staff processes, 2 54 it is cer-
tainly a step in the right direction. Further involvement by student-ath-
letes in the governance process, either directly or by representatives
selected to defend their interests, would help to ensure that academic
interests of student-athletes would be considered in the legislative and
enforcement processes.
Increased involvement on the part of student-athletes at the confer-
ence and institutional levels is also recommended. Student-athletes
should be represented on the athletics and other boards or groups in-
volved in making athletics policy at the institutional level. They also
should take an active role in the institutional self-study process and
should participate on search committees for coaches and other athletics
personnel. Finally, if my prior recommendations regarding accredita-
tion and academic impact statements are adopted, students should be
involved in those processes, as well. Student input need not be disposi-
tive, from a policy-making standpoint, but it should be given weight in
the decision-making process. Not surprisingly, given the lack of repre-
sentation on the part of student-athletes in the NCAA governance pro-
cess, glaring inequities in the treatment of student-athletes have
developed. Institutions have been protected in their relationship with
student-athletes but student-athletes lack parity with their institutions.
Student-athletes should be given more security in terms of their
scholarship status. Currently, under NCAA rules, a student-athlete has
only a one-year "contract," which is terminable at will by the institution
after the expiration of that one-year period. 25 5 While a student-athlete
is to be afforded a hearing opportunity before having his or her scholar-
ship terminated, 2 56 that hearing can be before either "the university's
athletics department or its faculty athletics committee,"'2 5 7 and the stu-
251. Early in his tenure, Director Schultz began to argue that student-athletes should
be assembled in regional meetings. See remarks of President Bailey in THIRD FORUM, supra
note 17, at 63.
252. Sixteen student-athletes were selected (eight from Division I and four each from
Divisions II and III, respectively) to serve with three members of the Council on the Stu-
dent-Athlete Advisory Committee, The student-athletes are to serve for up to two years
after they have used up their eligibility and are to react to NCAA legislation and legislative
proposals. See NCAA Selects Student-Athlete Advisory Committee, The NCAA News, July 19,
1989, at 1.
253. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1050-53.
254. Id.
255. NCAA Bylaw § 15.3.5, reprinted in NCAA MANUAt.. supra note 16, at 143.
256. NCAA Bylaw § 15.3.5.1.1, reprinted in id.
257. Id.
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dent-athlete is provided no substantive protection should the coach
want to replace the student-athlete with another athlete. Procedurally,
the hearings process should be amended to provide for a hearing before
a board that is not dominated by the athletics department and that
includes student-athletes as voting members. Substantively, schools
should be limited in terms of when they can "run off" a student-athlete
or take away the student-athlete's scholarship, by a set of standards re-
lated to the student-athlete's academic performance and his or her in-
volvement in practice and fulfillment of legitimate responsibilities as a
member of the team. Existing procedural and substantive infirmities are
exacerbated by an inequality of bargaining power between the student-
athlete and the institution. It is not surprising, therefore, that the insti-
tution may terminate the student-athlete's contract essentially at will af-
ter any academic year, while the student-athlete has no comparable right
to terminate. Indeed, the student-athlete can be precluded from partici-
pating in intercollegiate athletics at another institution for a one-year
period, even in instances when the institution has unilaterally termi-
nated its scholarship agreement with the student-athlete.
2 5 8
To help insure that student-athletes are not exploited by this one-
sided process, changes should be made to provide for equity. The stu-
dent-athlete should be permitted to transfer and receive a scholarship to
play at another institution, without having to sit out a year. Bylaw 14.6.5
expresses the rationale for the rule against transferring, when it notes
that the prohibition is directed to limit contacts of a student-athlete at
one institution by representatives of another institution, without the
permission of the first institution. 25 9 Given this rationale, the proper
penalty for transfers induced by a contact from another institution
should be to take action against the institution inducing the transfer, not
against the under-represented student.
260
Of course, if the institutions were willing to give four- or five-year
scholarships, the rules limiting transferees would be defensible, because
neither side would have the capacity to terminate at will. Lengthier
scholarship agreements also would seem to further academic objectives,
in that they permit an athlete to continue in the academic program of
one institution, without the threat of losing hours through a transfer.
Institutions should be required to bear more of the risk if they erred in
recruiting an athlete who does not prove to have the talent or ability to
258. Bylaw § 14.6.1, reprintedin NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, at 119. See also § 14.6.5,
dealing with four-year college transfers, id. at 124-27, and § 13.1.1.3, id. at 72, restricting
contacts by another institution's athletics staff with a student-athlete when that student-
athlete is attending another four-year institution. However, contact may be made if the
institution that the student-athlete currently attends deigns to permit such a contact.
259. Id. Contact may be made if the student-athlete's home institution, the institution
where he or she is matriculating or as to which the student-athlete has signed a letter of
intent, gives its consent to such a contact.
260. Bylaw § 13.1.1.3 provides that such a contact would constitute an infraction of the
NCAA rules. Id. at 72. Indeed, under that rule, the second institution may not provide aid
to the student-athlete who transfers for a one-year period. See G. Schubert, R. Smith &J.
Trentadue, SPORTS LAw 99 (1986) [hereinafter Schubert], for a discussion of potential
legal infirmities related to such restrictive transfer rules and limitations.
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fit into their program that the recruiter believed they would have. The
recruiter has access to more information regarding the fit of the student-
athlete with the institution's athletic program. The institution, there-
fore, should bear the risk of a poor fit rather than the student-athlete.
In a somewhat related sense, institutions should be penalized for or
otherwise prevented from "running players off." Whenever an institu-
tion terminates a student-athlete's scholarship, that institution forces the
student-athlete to transfer, with all that entails in terms of adverse aca-
demic impact, and may deprive the student-athlete of the funds neces-
sary to continue his or her education. To help deal with this inequity, at
a minimum, institutions should be given only a limited number of schol-
arships each year. For example, if a basketball program has 16 scholar-
ships, it should only be permitted to offer 4 or perhaps at the most 5
scholarships in any given year. Such a rule would create a disincentive
for an institution inclined to "run off" players who do not turn out to be
as good a fit, in terms of talent and temperament, with the institution's
athletics program and philosophy as the coaching staff anticipated. Inci-
dentally, such a rule would have another positive academic impact: it
would require the institution to work with student-athletes who have ac-
ademic problems and whose academic eligibility might be limited unless
they are supported in their academic efforts. The number of scholar-
ships overall might be increased, if the NCAA declared freshmen ineligi-
ble and permitted institutions to give athletes a fifth year scholarship
and, perhaps, even a sixth year of competition, as recommended else-
where in this article.
26 1
Student-athletes have little input in the governance of intercollegi-
ate athletics. Therefore, it should not be surprising that they have been
subjected to numerous procedural and substantive inequities. Student-
athlete involvement in the governance process at all levels should be
increased, and they should be afforded more equitable treatment in a
substantive sense, as well.
c. The Role in Reforming Big- Time Sports of Entities Outside the
Traditional Intercollegiate Athletics Governance Process
In addition to the NCAA, conferences and institutions, all of which
are directly related to intercollegiate athletics, governmental and private
entities sometimes get involved in the movement to reform big-time in-
tercollegiate athletics.
(1) The Federal Government
The federal government has exercised some indirect oversight over
intercollegiate athletics during most of this century. Indeed, the NCAA
was organized, in part, as a response to a call by President Theodore
Roosevelt in 1906 for the reform of intercollegiate football, after a
261. See discussion infra notes 316-18 and accompanying text.
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number of deaths had occurred during 1905.262 Thereafter, govern-
ment activity was relatively sparse for over 50 years, but beginning in the
1970s, involvement on the part of the federal government intensified.
2 6 3
The Supreme Court's recent decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma,264 has had a significant effect on intercollegiate
athletics. While Congressional activity has not resulted in the passage of
federal legislation, it nevertheless has had a significant effect on the gov-
ernance of intercollegiate athletics.
In its 1990 Convention, the NCAA passed graduation disclosure
legislation, 2 65 in direct response to proposed Congressional legislation
calling for such disclosure.26 6 That bill, S. 580, which had been spon-
sored by Senator Bill Bradley and which would have required gradua-
tion rate disclosure, had been voted out of committee favorably, by a
vote of fifteen to one.2 6 7 The NCAA, however, was able to hold off floor
action on the legislation, by promising that they would consider and pre-
sumably pass such legislation during the 1990 Convention, to be held in
the coming January.2 68 In responding to the Committee's report re-
garding the disclosure of graduation rates, Chancellor Tucker of Texas
Christian University was quoted as having said, "[w]e either take this
action for ourselves or we'll have it done for us. If it is done for us, it
will be done to us."
26 9
In their support of S. 508, the Senators asserted that the NCAA had
neglected academic values and had offered only "fitfull progress" in
its reform effort. 270 Similar complaints surface from time to time in
Congress,2 7 ' and tend to spur on reform of intercollegiate athletics.
Thoughtful Congressional action has had a positive influence in stimu-
lating the process of reform with the NCAA.
Given the positive influence of federal governmental activity in fur-
thering reform of intercollegiate athletics, a game plan for reform could
be supported by conscientious action in the halls of Congress and within
262. See Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 990-91.
263. Id. at 993-94.
264. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). This decision, which limited the NCAA's power relative to the
televising of football games, has had the effect of making the NCAA almost entirely depen-
dent on revenues generated from basketball games to fund its operations, including en-
forcement and compliance in all sports, and its reform efforts.
265. See Lederman, NCAA Adopts 3 Major Rules Changes Endorsed by Presidents' Panel, The
Chron. of Higher Educ., Jan. 17, 1990, at Al.
266. S. 580 would require institutions of higher education receiving federal financial
assistance to provide certain information with respect to graduation rates of student-ath-
letes at such institutions. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 1.
267. Id. at 3.
268. Schultz Offers Views on Pending Legislation, The NCAA News, Nov. 20, 1989, at 1, col.
4. Schultz argued that the legislation was unnecessary because the NCAA would act and
that governmental interference in the governance of intercollegiate athletics was
undesirable.
269. The Columbus Dispatch, Jan. 9, 1990, at Cl, col. 4.
270. SENATE REPORT, supra note 1, at 7.
271. See discussion regarding prior efforts in Congress to regulate or initiate reform in
intercollegiate athletics, Smith, Death Penalty. supra note 45, at 1035-36.
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the Executive Branch, for that matter. 2 72 In that regard, Congress
should hold hearings in support of a broader reform package, like the
one espoused in this article. Unfortunately, Congress has a tendency to
act on a piecemeal or single play basis, offering suggestions for limited
reform, like the graduation disclosure bill, rather than acting in a more
coherent and broadbased manner. At a minimum, the federal govern-
ment might put pressure on the NCAA to establish accreditation stan-
dards and an academic impact requirement for all legislation. In these
areas, the federal government could regulate by denying financial aid
funds to schools that do not accredit or otherwise promote academic
values in their athletics programs.
Such action by the federal government might induce significant re-
form on the part of the NCAA and would constitute just the kind of
support needed by those within the NCAA who favor major reform to
ensure academic integrity. Of course, such a dynamic is not without risk
- if the federal government threatens regulation and the NCAA fails to
respond, the federal government would either have to respond by ac-
knowledging that their action was but an idle threat or by passing some
legislation or initiating regulation, thereby entering the realm of inter-
collegiate athletics regulation.
National legislative pressure is preferable to state or local pressure,
because it provides for uniform application of the rules, and would not
run afoul of the equal competition or level playing field principle. It
might be argued, as well, that national legislative action is less likely to
be subject to the provincial biases that sometimes afflict state and local
governmental action.
2 73
In addition to holding hearings on legislation that would provide
for a major reform package, Congress might consider exempting the
NCAA from antitrust law. In Board of Regents, the Supreme Court has
previously held that the NCAA violated antitrust law when it exercised
control over the football television package offered by its members.
2 7 4
The Supreme Court's decision in that case has been criticized. 27 5
Whether that criticism is justified or not, Congress should consider ex-
empting the NCAA from antitrust law if the NCAA acts in a manner that
furthers academic values and integrity in sharing the revenues received
from its $1 billion television contract for basketball. If the NCAA comes
up with a revenue-sharing plan that allocates funds in a way that furthers
academic values, Congress should permit it to control television reve-
nues attributable to football, as well, since the CFA, which recently
272. See Schubert, supra note 260, at 100-13, for a discussion of sources of federal regu-
latory authority related to the governance of intercollegiate athletics.
273. But see Senator Wants Athletes to Stay in School, The NCAA News, May 3, 1989, at 16,
col. 1, for an analysis of Senator Johnston's (D-La.) legislative proposal designed to pre-
vent college athletes from signing professional contracts while attending school. Although
introduced at the federal level, Johnston's bill was provincial in that it was designed to
protect a Louisiana university from losing one of its best athletes to the professional ranks.
274. NCAA v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
275. See, e.g., Grauer, supra note 64 at 95-99.
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signed a $210 million television contract with ABC, 276 has done little or
nothing to reform athletics in furtherance of academic values.
(2) State and Local Government
State governments, in particular, have been increasingly active in
passing legislation that regulates intercollegiate athletics. 2 77 They have
also engaged in significant judicial activity.2 7 8 Of particular interest for
an analysis of structural reforms, are recent legislative efforts in Flor-
ida2 79 and Nevada 2 80 that would hold individuals liable if they engage in
activities that cause an institution of higher education in that state to be
punished by the NCAA for a major infraction. That type of legislation, if
applied to board members, presidents, athletics directors, coaches and
others, may help to support academic accountability in the governance
of intercollegiate athletics at institutions in those states.
Similarly, Boards of Regents in various states have taken actions
that could help further academic values in the governance of intercolle-
giate athletics in their states. For example, the Florida regents have es-
tablished a class attendance policy for athletes 28 1 and have considered a
requirement that public universities in Florida share bowl revenues.
2 82
Illinois has adopted legislation that facilitates the University of Illinois in
its efforts to gain control over its athletics budget. 283 Finally, Washing-
ton has adopted legislation to help ensure equity, particularly for wo-
men, in intercollegiate athletics.
2 84
Not all state governmental action is equally laudable, however. For
example, the Oklahoma regents recently passed guidelines for athletes
that would make a player charged with a crime ineligible to participate in
intercollegiate athletics. 28 5 That legislation is designed to help clean up
the athletics program at the University of Oklahoma, but it is poorly
focused. It would punish student-athletes, in effect finding them guilty
until proven innocent, and fails to address real academic needs. As out-
276. N.Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1990, at 45, col. 3.
277. See, e.g., The NCAA News, July 5, 1989, at 16, col. 1 listing pending legislation.
278. See, e.g., Kansas cases, supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text, and cases dis-
cussed in Schubert, supra note 260.
279. Florida H. I 1i0 provides that persons involved in the violation of NCAA rules and
regulations must compensate for damages incurred by a university or college penalized by
the NCAA. The NCAA News, July 5, 1989, at 16, col. 1.
280. See supra note 173 and accompanying text, and The NCAA News, July 5, 1989, at
17, for a discussion regarding Nevada A. 563 that provides for a similar cause of return.
281. The NCAA News, Aug. 30, 1989, at 3, col. 4.
282. Florida CEOs Control Funds, The NCAA News, Dec. 20, 1989, at 4, col. 4. Such
revenue-sharing should be tied to academic purposes. The Regents also acted to give
CEOs control over spending at the University to ensure that all income for coaches is
directed through the university. Id.
283. 1989 Ill. Legis. Serv. 86-6 provides that "[a] domestic corporation which carries
on athletic sports and promotes athletic interests among students of a state university with
which it is affiliated may be merged into a body corporate and politic which manages and
governs the state university."
284. The NCAA News, July 5, 1989, at 18, col. 3. H. 2020 would provide state funds
for scholarships for women student-athletes to help promote gender equality in intercolle-
giate athletics.
285. The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 22, col. 1.
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lined in this article, a state like Oklahoma could do much to reform its
athletics programs, without unduly and inequitably impacting on stu-
dent-athletes. For example, the Regents might create reporting and ac-
creditation standards for its universities.
State legislators and other governmental officers often are reluctant
to move in the direction of reform for fear that they will jeopardize the
ability of their institutions' athletics programs to compete with institu-
tions outside the state that are not similarly governed. For example, the
Governor in Florida recently called for the establishment of a statewide
athletics control office, but he cautioned that Florida could not act uni-
laterally in a way that would compromise the ability of the state's institu-
tions of higher education involved in big-time intercollegiate athletics to
compete with schools outside the state. 28 6 Thus, while state and local
action to stimulate reform should be applauded, it would be naive to
anticipate that local or statewide reform will be very significant.
(3) Private Entities
Private entities also play a role in stimulating reform in intercollegi-
ate athletics. Foundations and other entities concerned with the opera-
tion of intercollegiate athletics can be a positive force in reform efforts.
The Knight Foundation recently has funded a blue-ribbon commit-
tee to study big-time intercollegiate athletics and to offer suggestions for
reform. 28 7 The study is due during the summer of 1991. The makeup
of this committee almost guarantees that its suggestions will be thought-
ful and helpful.
2 88
Other foundations and entities could provide support for studies
and for programs initiated at the institutional or conference levels
designed to promote academic values in the operation of big-time ath-
letics programs. For example, foundations and groups familiar with aca-
demic support and related issues could offer economic support and
expertise to institutions that conscientiously desire to provide academic
assistance to their student-athletes and to ground their athletics pro-
grams in academic values.
Finally, as the NCAA considers how it will spend the revenues gen-
erated by the $1 billion television contract, consideration should be
given to providing significant funds for research and development of
programs, at the institutional and conference levels, to further academic
values in intercollegiate athletics. A foundation might be created or
funded for precisely that purpose.
2 89
286. The NCAA News, Nov. 6, 1989, at 3, col. 5.
287. See Lederman, Reform Panel, supra note 72, at Al, col. 1.
288. Id. Father Hesburgh, former President of Notre Dame, and President Friday,
President Emeritus of the University of North Carolina system, are both respected and
knowledgeable figures in the area of intercollegiate sports.
289. The NCAA Foundation "was formed by the Association for the purpose of receiv-
ing and administering funds to advance scientific, educational and charitable purposes of
the NCAA." NCAA Executive Regulation 31.9.4, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16,
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(D) Summary
With a focus on academic values, structural reforms could be effec-
tuated at numerous levels that would improve intercollegiate athletics.
In turn, those reforms can be most meaningful when they are consid-
ered as a package, rather than as parts of a reluctant, piecemeal reform
effort. If, indeed, the 1991 Convention of the NCAA is to be reform-
oriented in a major way, it should consider a package of structural re-
forms. The NCAA's structural reform effort could be supplemented or
stimulated by prompt and thoughtful governmental demands and foun-
dational support.
IV. EFFECTUATING ACADEMIC VALUES: A BRIEF LOOK AT SOME
CONTEMPORARY SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Placing one's focus on academic values in evaluating reform efforts
related to the governance and operation of big-time intercollegiate ath-
letics suggests and casts light upon significant substantive reforms, as
well as structural ones. In this part of this article, I will briefly examine
two substantive issues of contemporary significance and will suggest
how a focus on academic values can inform one's analysis of those is-
sues. This analysis is not intended to be exhaustive either as to the
breadth of the issues covered or as to the depth of analysis as to the
issues discussed. It is, nevertheless, intended to outline an appropriate
analytical approach to such issues.
A. A National Championship in Football
The issue of whether or not there ought to be a national champion-
ship in football was raised with some furor again this year, in part due to
lingering doubts with regard to who should be declared the national
champion in 1989. Numerous academics, including Gordon Gee, Presi-
dent of the University of Colorado, 290 are joined by many coaches in
opposing the idea of holding a national championship in football.
29 1 If
created, such a playoff would no doubt be modeled in some fashion after
the national championships at the Division II and III levels and the na-
tional championship in basketball, although it is unlikely that the field of
participants would be as large in football as basketball because football
teams play far fewer games and need more time to prepare physically for
a game.
In offering his thoughtful piece opposing a national championship,
President Gee asserted that, "it is clear that calls for a national playoff
game are marked by disregard for academic identity and values and by
at 351. This Foundation provides the shell for such activity and ought to be utilized more
effectively.
290. Gee, A College Superbowl: The Ultimate Sellout, N.Y. Times,Jan. 1, 1990, at 19, col. 2
[hereinafter Gee].
291. In a recent survey of Division I-A football coaches, it was revealed that 28 of 67 of
the coaches responding were opposed to a national playoff in any form. Columbus Dis-
patch, Jan. 5, 1990.
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unseemly commercialism.' '292 Later in that same article, Gee opined
that, "[t]he drive for success-at-all-costs would only be accelerated if we
added a national playoff game. We in higher education have no busi-
ness entertaining such notions, for a championship would take us one
step further toward the complete commercialization of collegiate athlet-
ics." 2 9 3 Finally, he relates his argument to the needs of student-athletes
when he states that, "[w]e have a responsibility to our students and to
society to seek cost containment and reduction. Even if additional reve-
nue were to be directed to academic programs, those programs would
then become inappropriately dependent upon commercial interests
completely unrelated to academic values or the public interest.
'2 94
At first blush, President Gee's argument seems to indicate that a
national championship in football necessarily runs counter to academic
values. However, upon further reflection, his argument appears to be
superficial. Broken down into a simple syllogism, Gee's argument runs
something like this: a national championship in football would result in
further commercialization of big-time intercollegiate football; commer-
cialization is contrary to academic values; therefore, a national playoff is
contrary to academic values. Each step in this syllogism is suspect.
First, it is not clear that a national championship would result in
further commercialization of football. With the College Football Associ-
ation obtaining a $210 million, five year television package, and with the
vast sums of money earned by teams involved in football bowl games,
29 5
it is not clear that revenues or commercialization would be increased if a
national championship were to be held. The bowl field is much wider
than the playoff field would have to be. A national playoff, therefore,
might result in a reduction of revenues.
Second, it is hardly clear that commercialization or revenue produc-
tion2 9 6 is contrary to academic values. Gee argues that, even if the dol-
lars generated from a playoff were used for academic purposes or in
furtherance of academic values, the end result of such a playoff would be
contrary to academic values. Gee seems to be implying that since funds
would not be received on a consistent basis, schools would be induced
to try to win-at-all-costs to avoid losing the funds that would go to the
winners in any given year. This reasoning is faulty because: (1) the con-
cept of a national championship could be combined with a revenue-shar-
292. Gee, supra note 290.
293. Id. at col. 4.
294. Id. at col. 6.
295. See, e.g., Lederman, Bowl Game Revenue May Top $57 Million, The Chron. of Higher
Educ., Dec. 6, 1989, at A29.
296. See, e.g., discussion in Smith, Sixth Special Convention, supra note 32. In particular,
Donna Lopiano, Associate Athletics Director at the University of Texas, argued that com-
mercialization is neutral. She added, however, that:
We must agree with [those]... who support the notion that the NCAA must con-
trol distribution of NCAA championship profits to benefit all institutions, in the
same way that a multiinstitutional research consortium equitably distributes prof-
its among all members regardless of the institutional affiliation of the researcher
who makes a commercially viable discovery.
Id. at 451-52.
272 [Vol. 67:2
AN ACADEMIC GAME PLAN
ing package that would share funds among schools at that level and
direct the vast majority of funds to academic purposes on an annual ba-
sis; and (2) even if there were not such revenue-sharing package, it is not
clear that the sporadic receipt of funds would denigrate academic pur-
poses, if funds were used to create an endowment to benefit student-
athletes or were otherwise spent wisely.29 7 Indeed, President Gee is no
doubt involved in fundraising on a regular basis at the University of Col-
orado and it is unlikely that he would be inclined to turn down a one-
time gift of seven figures, simply because receipt of that gift would whet
the appetite of the academic program receiving it. Thus, it would seem
to follow, contrary to Gee's reasoning, that receipt of the funds is, if
anything, neutral, and focus must be directed to how it is spent. Fur-
thermore, if a national championship in football could be tied to aca-
demic values and revenue-sharing for such purposes, it might be a
beneficial reform.
What steps should be taken to tie a national championship to aca-
demic values? First, to maximize the academic values furthered, such a
championship should be tied to a revenue-sharing program that would
direct revenues or a substantial proportion of the revenues received to
academic purposes. Second, care would have to be taken not to extend
the season in a manner that increased the academic impact on the stu-
dent-athlete's academic program or progress. In this regard, if the
championship could be tied to a shorter season, as it effectively is in
Divisions II and 111,298 academic values might be furthered. Of course,
if the number of games in a team's season were cut, it might place the
student-athlete in the classroom with more regularity, a fact that seems
to be directly related to his academic performance,2 99 but it might entail
some loss in revenue to the institution. Where revenue currently is used
for academic purposes, such losses might indirectly inhibit the further-
ance of academic values.
If a national championship were included in a reform package, and
was tied to significant revenue-sharing for academic purposes, it might
be a boon to academic values. Indeed, given the sporadic commitment
of dollars to academic purposes and programs by the CFA and others
involved in big-time football, as it is currently organized, a national
championship might be warranted. However, before a playoff is inaugu-
rated, I would want to be assured that it could be tied to academic val-
297. President Gee seems to be arguing that the receipt of one-time or sporadic fund-
ing taints intercollegiate athletics. While receipt of such funds no doubt whets the aca-
demic appetite, it need not taint the operation of intercollegiate athletics any more than
the receipt of a one-time grant or gift would taint the operation of another academic de-
partment. The funds are not the problem. The way they are monitored and administered,
however, might create problems, particularly if unfair demands are placed on athletics
personnel regarding the need to win-at-all-costs to generate more funds in the future.
298. The Division II and III playoffs end before many of the bowl games are played by
Division I-A schools. Indeed, the season could be structured to have the playoff end
before final exams in the fall semester. Of course, to do so might require a reduction in
conference games, but such reductions certainly are feasible.
299. See Bohrnstedt comments regarding the AIR Report dealing with the performance
of student-athletes in The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 14, col. 2.
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ues. This might be achieved through federal legislation exempting the
NCAA from antitrust liability for televising big-time football on the con-
dition that a substantial portion of the funds generated are used for a set
of clearly delineated academic purposes.30 0 If such legislation were in-
troduced in Congress, it might also stimulate the CFA to use a portion
of its funds for academic purposes, in an effort to sidetrack the legisla-
tion. At any rate, such legislation could stimulate meaningful reform.
B. Paying Athletes
For the past several years, there has been repeated support for the
proposition that student-athletes participating in revenue-producing in-
tercollegiate sports should be paid for their efforts. 30 1 Even some of the
presidents of major universities are now calling for compensation for
athletes involved in revenue-producing sports.30 2 The President of the
University of Washington, for example, recently argued that athletes
should be paid since major revenue-producing sports were little more
than "farm clubs for the NFL and NBA." °3 0 3 Other commentators have
argued that a semi-professional or minor league should be established,
either within higher education or under the auspices of a separate,
noneducational entity.3 0 4 These arguments for paying college athletes
draw support from the notion that the athletes are more like entertain-
ers than students and, as such, should be compensated for the entertain-
ment they provide.
Short of the actual establishment of a minor league or outright pay-
ment of salaries to the athletes, steps already have been taken to in-
crease the value of the scholarships received by student-athletes, at least
where need is evident.3 0 5 In his 1990 State of the Association address,
Director Schultz recently advocated even more aid for student-athletes
involved in big-time sports:
Let's permit institutions to provide athletes all supplies re-'
quired for a course by a professor and approved by the faculty
athletics representative, and let's provide financial aid in Divi-
sion I up to the cost of attendance, regardless of need. Let's
300. Director Schultz has said that he "would like to get back to where we just play for
the championship and the trophy. If we're going to achieve reform in college sports, we
need to change the model, and the distribution plan is a good place to start." Lederman,
TV Bonanza. If the NCAA initiates such revenue-sharing of basketball revenues for aca-
demic purpose, it should be given power, through relaxation of antitrust laws, over televi-
sion revenues for football as well.
301. See, e.g., Smith, Death Penalty, supra note 45, at 1053-54, for a discussion of a
number of such proposals.
302. See, e.g., The NCAA News, Nov. 6, 1989, at 5, col. I (Comments of the President at
the University of Washington).
303. Cited in Freshman Ineligibility- Whose Interests Are Served?, The NCAA News, Nov. 6,
1989, at 5.
304. See, e.g., TELANDER, supra note 7, at 212-21, and Rush, supra note 42, at 589-91.
305. During 1980's, the amount of actual aid received by needy student-athletes has
increased as has the relative value of a college degree. See Vobeja, Relative Value of a College
Degree Soared in 1980s, Wash. Post, May 3, 1989, at A12 [hereinafter Vobeja] and NCAA
Bylaw § 15.2.4, reprinted in NCAA MANUAL supra note 16, at 139, indicating increased sup-
port for student-athletes from government grant sources.
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establish an emergency loan system for needy athletes and
transportation expenses home for those who are required to
forgo vacations for reasons of athletics participation.
We should continue to review rules that pertain to elite and
Olympic athletes, including trust funds that would be adminis-
tered by a national governing body. And we should consider
an endowment fund that would permit a small cash bonus for
an athlete graduating within five years.
30 6
With actual moves to increase existing aid and with growing support for
further compensation, it is inevitable that student-athletes involved in
major, revenue-producing sports will be receiving additional compensa-
tion, but the form that such payments will take is quite important.
The focus of such compensation should not be on the athlete as an
entertainer but rather should be on the athlete as a student. Compensa-
tion should further educational values and objectives. As one former
athlete has noted, "[fjor 99% of scholarship athletes in revenue-produc-
ing sport, college education is the primary value desired." 30 7 This ob-
servation receives corroboration in the recent independent study of
college athletes prepared for the NCAA - student-athletes, even in rev-
enue-producing sports, want to receive an education.
30 8
Nevertheless, there are advocates of academic values who still argue
that leagues should be formed using players who are not full-time col-
lege students, in recognition of the athlete's right to choose. 30 9 In my
view, if such minor leagues are established, they should be sponsored by
entities outside higher education. Indeed, if there really is a market for
a "minor league" in football and basketball, that talented athletes would
choose over athletic opportunities tied to educational institutions, that
market ultimately should generate such a league in response to existing
demand. In such a league, rather than being compensated with educa-
tional opportunity, the athletes could receive actual salaries or
compensation.
Higher educational institutions should not compromise their educa-
tional purposes by creating such leagues. Nevertheless, they should do
nothing to prevent an athlete from choosing to leave school to partici-
pate in professional sports.3t 0 Institutions of higher education should
focus the thrust of additional compensation packages on educational
values. Thus, while I agree that student-athletes involved in major, rev-
enue-producing sports should receive more compensation, because they
are responsible for the generation of that revenue and ought to receive
306. The NCAA News, supra note 90, at 6, col. 4.
307. David Meggyesy in LAPCHICK AND SLAUGHTER, supra note 43, at 120.
308. See NCAA News, Feb, 15, 1989, at 17, and supra note 249.
309. Weistart, supra note 22, at 59.
310. See article regarding the National Football League's relaxation of its rules related
to undergraduate access to the NFI's draft. N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1990, at !, col. 4. Stu-
dent-athletes who desire to go professional should be permitted to do so, although it is
arguable that the NFL. team drafting the athlete should provide him with a scholarship
should he decide to return to school.
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the just fruits of their labors, that compensation can and should be di-
rected to educational purposes.
To begin with, the institutions ought to recognize and share with
the student-athlete the fact that there is value related to the education
they supply.3 11 Furthermore, they should recognize the fact that stu-
dent-athletes have significant demands on their time and, therefore, typ-
ically take at least five years to graduate. 312 Given this fact, institutions
should be required to provide a five-year scholarship to their ath-
letes. 313 In 1982, an independent Committee established by the NCAA
recommended that student-athletes be given a fifth year scholarship af-
ter having used up their four years of eligibility. 3 14 Such a suggestion is
laudable and could be made even more practical, from a cost-contain-
ment point of view, by permitting the student-athlete to have five rather
than four years of eligibility. If a rule requiring freshmen ineligibility is
warranted, the scholarship could be for five, or perhaps even six years,
based on some definite academic progress requirements tied to gradua-
tion in a timely fashion. Evidence seems to indicate that student-ath-
letes do as well or better academically during the season when they are
participating in their sport, 3 15 thus there would seem to be little harm to
the student-athlete, if we were to extend his or her compensation an
additional year, in exchange for another year of participation.
I opt for this practical approach, that acknowledges the need for
cost-containment, because I agree with Professor Weistart's observation
that reform proposals need to be accompanied by "efforts to reduce and
equalize athletic expenditures among institutions. ' 3 16 I would also pro-
vide for further cost-containment by limiting scholarships in minor, non-
revenue-producing sports to aid based on need. In my view, there sim-
ply is no reason why well-to-do athletes in minor nonrevenue-producing
sports should receive compensation out of a pool largely generated by
student-athletes in revenue-producing sports. Put more bluntly, it
hardly seems right to take dollars generated by basketball and football
players at the Division I level, a large number of whom are minorities
and individuals from lower socio-economic backgrounds, to support
athletes in minor sports who come from more privileged backgrounds.
The only possible exception to this need-based limitation would be ma-
jor women's sports, which could be subsidized on the basis that such
assistance is designed to remedy past discrimination, although one must
wonder as to whether it is appropriate to fund women's sports out of the
efforts of basketball and football players, many of whom are from disad-
311. See Vobeja, supra note 305.
312. Given time demands on the student-athlete, five years of study are typically re-
quired. See, e.g., The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 12, col. 1, for a discussion of the AIR
Report that tends to confirm this fact.
313. Some schools, including Big 10 institutions, voluntarily give an athlete a fifth year
scholarship after he has completed his athletic eligibility. This voluntary practice should
be made mandatory.
314. 1982 REPORT, supra note 75, at 22.
315. See supra note 249.
316. Weistart, supra note 22.
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vantaged or minority backgrounds. The money saved by reforming
scholarship or financial aid rules in this manner could be used to fund
additional scholarship aid for needy athletes and for academic and re-
lated support for these athletes.
Previously, I have argued that student-athletes should be given a
scholarship over the period of their anticipated time of eligibility, rather
than for the one-year period provided for under current rules.3 17 Ex-
tending eligibility for an additional year would provide for five years of
scholarship assistance and a five-year educational "contract" between
the student-athlete and the institution. From the student-athlete's point
of view, the only conditions subsequent placed on the term and enforce-
ment of the contract should be that: (1) he or she meets rather stringent
academic progress requirements - these rules should reflect progress
toward a degree on a five, or perhaps, six-year timetable; and (2) he or
she complies with reasonable team rules.
The mandatory five or six-year scholarship, as additional compensa-
tion, should be accompanied by further aid or compensation in the form
of academic support. Since the student-athletes generate substantial
revenue, and take considerable time out of their study week to do so, 318
they should be supplied with academic assistance, in the form of tutors
supplied and overseen by academic as opposed to athletics department
personnel and study aids such as computer access and training. Mean-
ingful academic compensation could be supplied if study and computer
rooms for athletes were designed that rivaled weight and training facili-
ties currently provided. Indeed, expenditure of funds for such purposes
would send a significant signal to the athletes and others that academics
are important. In extending such academic assistance, care should be
taken to ensure that student-athletes are not entirely separated from the
remainder of the student body; however, such need for integration
should not and need not take precedence over the student-athlete's spe-
cial academic needs.
By focusing on academic values in compensating student-athletes,
and by coupling that focus with attention on equitable cost-containment,
institutions could help their academic image without incurring addi-
tional costs. If revenue-sharing at the national level were designed to
support such an effort, great strides could be taken to limit costs, while
strengthening the academic image of intercollegiate athletics. Such
moves would not detract from either the macro or the micro educational
values that must be central to the operation of intercollegiate athletics
programs and would do much to strengthen those values.
V. CONCLUSION
The push for the reform of intercollegiate athletics continues.
However, reform efforts have been sporadic and lacking in a coherent
317. See supra notes 312-15 and accompanying text.
318. See, e.g., AIR Report discussed in The NCAA News, Feb. 15, 1989, at 12, col. 1.
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philosophy or theme. No self-respecting coach would ever enter a sig-
nificant game with a game plan as ill-conceived as the one heretofore
espoused by reformers of intercollegiate athletics. It is little wonder,
then, that reform efforts have seemed almost laughable at times. If the
1990s are to be the era of major reform in intercollegiate athletics, and
institutions of higher education are to retain their academic integrity, a
game plan for reform based-on academic values must be established and
implemented.
In this article, I have discussed the nature ofjust such a game plan.
It is certainly beyond the scope of this article to discuss every aspect of
such reform in detail, but it is hoped that this effort is sufficiently specific
to provide a meaningful game plan for reform efforts in early 1990's.
Even the best devised game plans are revised during the course of the
game, but they nevertheless provide the foundation for what ensues. It
is just such a foundation that has been lacking in reform efforts to date.
Perhaps, educators have something to learn from their coaching coun-
terparts with regard to game plans, and surely everyone in education
can benefit from participation in learning experiences.
